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TOP SECRET

At the Secret Meeting  
of the Third Special Committee of the  
Japan Diplomatic Association

Delivered by Vice-Admiral TOYODA, Soemu,  
Chief of the Naval Affairs Bureau of Navy Ministry

(SUMMARY)

Outline of Naval Budget for the Fiscal Year 1937  
and the  
General Aspect of National Defense  
Related to the Navy

(January, 1937)

Japan Diplomatic Association

This is the gist of the speech delivered by Chief of Naval Affairs Bureau of Navy Ministry TOKODA at a secret meeting of the Third Special Committee of our association (concerning diplomacy and the Navy). It has been recorded by the secretary of this association. Consequently, we have not obtained the speaker's consent nor his perusal of this speech. Naturally, this association bears entire responsibility for this copy.

Investigation Bureau  
Japan Diplomatic Association

December, 1937

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Outline of Naval Budget for the  
Next Fiscal Year  
and  
General Aspect of National Defense as  
Related to the Navy

Delivered by

Mr. TOYODA, Soemu, Vice Admiral,  
Chief of Naval Affairs Bureau of  
Navy Ministry

It is an honor for me to have the opportunity to focus my talk on the naval budget for the next fiscal year and to speak on what the Navy is thinking about. As I have made hasty preparations for this speech, I am afraid you will find it hard to listen to. You are cordially requested to ask me questions and to give comments later on.

The order of my speech will be as follows: The present international situation and the viewpoint of the Imperial Navy; recent conditions of the British and U. S. navies and those of other Powers; what the future armament policy of the Imperial Navy should be on the basis of the recent international situation and the recent naval conditions of the various Powers; then the outline and the key points of the naval budget for the next fiscal year drawn up on the basis of the aforesaid policy of armament; and the future of the ship construction competition about which so much is being said. I should like to give my personal opinions on these questions first, and then, taking into consideration the aforesaid future situation, to speak on what the Imperial Navy's budget ought to be in years to come.

1. Determination to cope with the non-treaty era.

Though our delegates attended the disarmament conference held in London from the end of last year to the beginning of this year, with the claim that externally we would promote a feeling of national safety and internally reduce the burden on the people by reducing our naval armament as much as possible by cutting down on aggressive armament and by intensifying the defensive power according to the fundamental policy of non-threat and non-invasion, the Powers



did not recognize our just and rational claim; and the Empire was obliged to withdraw from the conference. Within ten days we entered a naval non-treaty era as far as Japan was concerned, but we do not intend to encourage a ship-building competition nor a threat to other Powers, as we, as the Japanese Government or as the Imperial Navy, have taken every opportunity to declare both before and after the Disarmament Conference and up to the present. We have a firm intention to push our naval armaments in the future with this conviction. But although we would not encourage ship-building competition, we cannot remain a spectator, leaving the armaments to take care of themselves if we look at the present international situation and consider the fact that naval armament has an important relation to the execution of the national policy. There is no denying that there is an urgent need to observe the situation closely and to set up a plan to cope with it. Since the present international situation as it concerns Japan is one of the subjects which it is the duty of this association to study, your Excellencies are well aware of the said situation and as it is I who will have to ask for your instructions, I shall not go into details.

When I think of the diplomatic developments up to now from the time of the outbreak of the Manchurian Incident and from the time of our withdrawal from the League of Nations two years ago, I feel that importance and difficulty are being added day by day to Japan's national defense. During the interim, there have been ups and downs, and I cannot say that when we look at the future the present state of affairs is reassuring.

2. Britain, U. S., Soviet Russia and China  
as the central consideration.

I believe that Britain, U. S., Soviet Russia and China will become the core of Japan's external relations to which we shall have to give our closest attention. Though our navy has no direct relation with Soviet Russia, we have, of course, several indirect relationships. However, our navy is not so much concerned with Russia as with Britain and the U. S. Although I shall refrain from speaking in full detail here, we are well aware of the fact that the army will have to replenish its armament as preparation against Soviet Russia.

The greatest obstacle to the execution of Japan's foreign policy can never be limited to Soviet Russia alone. I feel that we must concern ourselves especially with Britain and the U.S.A. Even now we can draw such conclusion, judging from the naval armament of those two countries. England has important rights and interests in China, not to mention India, and, of course, she must have enough power to secure such rights and interests; on the other hand, the U. S. does not have such big interests in China nor in other Oriental countries. She has few overseas investments and little trade as compared with Japan. Nevertheless, the U. S. in the past few years, especially since the



outbreak of the Manchurian Incident, has been making a great effort to complete the equipment of her Navy. If we consider this fact and the attitude which her Navy is taking at present, we shall clearly understand what the U. S. has in mind. Some Americans, and even some Japanese, often say that the U. S. does not have such big interests in the Orient and that for this reason common sense tells us that the U. S. will absolutely not attack Japan. On the contrary, I feel that reality indicates that the U. S. has a special concern to suppress Japan. There are wars in the absolute sense, and wars in the relative sense. If Japan and the U. S. should fight one another in the future the war will be absolute and a question of life and death to Japan; but not to the U. S. That is, to the U. S. it will be a war for her prosperity, while it will be a question of life or death to Japan. Therefore, viewed from a common sense standpoint, it is absurd to say that the U. S. will spend so much money and make various large scale gestures to put pressure on Japan. But actually she is doing so. The U. S. naval installations of recent years and the question of stationing the Pacific fleet permanently in the East, of which I will speak more fully later, have no other object than to check and oppress Japan.

In short, both the U. S. and Britain do not like Japan's development in the East. It is their basic idea to wish to check it in some way and to nip it in the bud; consequently, various questions which accidentally occur in the international relation, are always based on the aforesaid idea, though the situations may differ. We must, therefore, keep this in mind all the time, and to say that the U. S. has relaxed her pressure or has tightened it by looking at her superficial behavior must be avoided so that we may not mistake the main issue. After all, the Imperial Navy has not the least intention of attacking the U. S., at least at the present time, but we must be prepared at any cost with an invincible attitude. I believe that it is only by this attitude that Japan's foreign policy will be guaranteed.

### 3. Comparison of Japanese, British and U. S. Naval Expenditures.

I shall speak on the latest situation of British and U. S. navies.

In comparing the British, U. S. and Japanese naval expenditures, as shown in Table I, we find that the Manchurian Incident which broke out in 1931, and the Shanghai Incident in 1932, have made it necessary for Japan to make a supplementary budget, etc., raising the amount to ¥300,000,000. Since then the amount has increased yearly. The measures which Japan was obliged to take to cope with the tenseness in the international situation appear in the budget. Likewise, the budgets of the British and U. S. navies have also rapidly increased during the past three years.

TABLE I

NAVAL EXPENDITURE		(Unit - one million)					
	1930	1931	1932	1933	1934	1935	1936
UNITED STATES (dollars)	383	360	329	406	455	482	527
BRITAIN (pounds)-Navy	52.6	51.6	50.5	53.6	58.8	67.8	84.7
" " -Air Force	17.9	15.1	17.4	17.4	20.4	30.8	55.2
JAPAN (yen)	263	211	307	404	489	530	550

#### 4. U. S. Ship-building Program and its Present Condition.

The latest ship-building program of the U. S. and its present state of progress are shown in Table II. Almost in the same way as the Japanese Navy, the U. S. Navy draws up a comprehensive ship-building program to be effected within a limited number of years, but the budget is not in the form of continuous expenditures like that of Japan, but the necessary budget is appropriated yearly. Consequently, it often happens that even if a program has been decided on the ship building does not go according to the program, depending on the financial situation at the time.

The biggest plan now existing is the Vinson plan which was set up in 1934, involving 102 ships, about 200,000 tons, at a cost of \$800,000,000, which is expected to be completed by 1939, so it will be finished in 1940. In addition to the above, in the preceding year, she was building 32 ships, about 120,000 tons, with a budget of \$238,000,000, derived from the money from the Sangyo Fukkoku (Reconstruction Finance) as an emergency project.

Another is the Navy Completion Plan which was supplemented successively from 1916 to 1929. This, however, was not completed by 1929, as expected, and in 1933, the building of 11 ships of about 35,000 tons, costing approximately \$120,000,000, was left undone. This program is also underway at present.

Of the above programs, about 68 ships are not yet laid down for construction; about 63 ships, 223,000 tons, are under construction; while the rest have already been completed. The expenditures for building these ships do not cover the whole of the naval budget. Construction expenditures were \$38,000,000 in 1931, which increased yearly, and finally amounted to more than \$200,000,000 in 1935. The estimate for 1936 is \$168,000,000. These plans aim at the completion of Treaty navy of which the U. S. so often speaks, i.e., a plan to prepare the amount of ships stipulated both in the Washington and the

London Treaties. Accordingly, if these plans go smoothly, in 1940 the U. S. navy will come to possess the naval force provided for in the two treaties. This includes not only replenishment for the lack of new ships, but also the construction of ships to replace the out-of-date ones. Besides this, though the official report has not yet reached us, it seems that a new plan is under way which mainly provides for the building of 2 battleships and 12 Class-B cruisers. There are, in addition, ships and boats which do not come under the limitations, or special service ships. In the budget for the current fiscal year, a ~~2,120,000~~ <sup>220,000</sup> ton building plan was presented, but was not adopted by Congress because it could not get through the discussion stage.

At any rate, it may be perceived that the U. S. will come to possess the number of ships stipulated both in the Washington and the London Treaties. It is not certain whether the U. S. has any intention of expanding her navy beyond this plan, but, according to what was declared by the responsible people of the U. S. Government in Congress, or on various other occasions, she will respect the past two Treaties to the utmost and has no intention of increasing her naval plan. This, however, cannot be fully relied upon (as it may change) according to the development of the situation in the future. Generally speaking, it would not be a great mistake to believe that the U. S. will effect the completion of naval armaments based on the tonnage of ships stipulated both in the Washington and the London Treaties in the coming four or five years.

TABLE II

#### U. S. SHIPBUILDING PROGRAM AND ITS PRESENT STATE OF PROGRESS

Vinson Plan	1934 Program
102 ships, about 200,000 tons	\$800,000,000
	(to be finished by 1939)
From the Sangyo Fudokai (RFC Funds)	1933 Program
32 ships, about 120,000 tons	\$238,000,000
The remainder of the plan for 1916 and 1929 (construction to be commenced after 1933).	
11 ships, about 35,000 tons - about \$120,000,000	
Of the above-mentioned plans:	
Not yet begun	about 68 ships 115,000 tons (a part of the Vinson Plan)
Under construction	about 63 ships 233,000 tons
The rest are already completed.	

BUILDING EXPENDITURES							
Year	1930	1931	1932	1933	1934	1935	1936
Unit - One million dollars	42.4	38.3	62.9	90.0	182.2	216.5	168.5



5. U. S. Establishments for naval operations in the Pacific.

Next, I shall speak on the U. S. establishments for naval operations in the Pacific. It is an obvious fact that the U. S. has been laying great stress on land and water establishments in the Pacific area of recent years. After the Washington Treaty the U. S. set to work on a 20 year plan with a budget of \$150,000,000 for the improvement of land and water establishments in the Pacific area, but that program has not made much progress since then owing to the policy of financial retrenchment and so on. She took much interest in the equipment of Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, but, besides this, there was no other notable phenomenon.

As soon as the Manchurian Incident broke out, however, the U. S. suddenly changed her attitude. She increased her naval budget and besides she began to lay much stress on the Pacific area by means of Sangyo Fukushi (RFC funds). The establishment on which the greatest importance was laid was Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. The detailed figures of the sum of money spent here are not at hand now, but to cite the latest example, 1936, \$15,000,000 out of \$38,000,000 appropriated as expenditures for land and water equipment was allocated to this port, and we hear that almost 80 or 90 per cent of the work is finished and the whole is nearing completion. Actually when the grand naval maneuver was held last year in the Pacific area, the whole fleet entered Pearl Harbor at the same time for supplies and rest. Hereafter, also, she will take more interest in that harbor; for instance, she has a plan to build two floating docks which will be made with pointed bows so that they can be towed and can sail under their own power. I cannot say for certain, but, at any rate, it seems that she has a plan for building such things and defraying therefor the amount of \$10,000,000 to this harbor. This material is evidence to show how earnest the U. S. is about operations in the Pacific area.

In addition to the above, along the western coast of the continent, starting from the north, at Seattle, San Francisco, Los Angeles, San Pedro and Panama, she is taking steps to increase equipment so as to perfect these ports for repair, supply and recuperation purposes. Since the outbreak of the Manchurian Incident, the U. S. fleet has continued to be stationed in the Pacific area, and the American people as well as ourselves were at the outset anxious that if it were to be stationed there for a long time it would be impossible for the U. S. to maintain the fleet on the Pacific Coast, but the fact is that she has managed to maintain them on the western coast by means of prompt increase of land and water installations.

Only those ships requiring great scale reconstruction sail to the eastern coast, and daily repairs, docking, repainting of the ships' bottoms and such other works are all arranged for somehow or other on the western coast. Last year when the major part of the U. S. fleet sailed to the eastern coast, we heard that no workmen went to the fleet from the New York Navy Yard, which fact is almost unbelievable to us of the Japanese Navy. But this is

strong evidence to show on one hand that U. S. ships have perfect mechanical equipment and that they are quite self-sufficient. On the other hand, it shows land and water equipment on the Pacific Coast is so complete that there is nothing lacking for the maintenance and repair of a big fleet. Besides these, the U. S. has been making great efforts recently to complete air bases and to investigate the weather conditions around Alaska and the Aleutians in the north. It is also said that some army air forces are stationed in Alaska and that they are being trained. At any rate, the U. S. is making strenuous efforts for the defense of the north, the completion and investigation of the important strategic points and such others. Thus the amount of money defrayed recently for land and water equipment, as shown in Table III, while it was only about 4,000,000 in 1925, has exceeded \$10,000,000 each year in recent years. In 1936 it amounted to \$38,000,000. We can perceive the general situation from these facts.

#### 6. The Strength of the U. S. Naval Air Force

Next, I shall speak on the U. S. naval air force. Like Japan, the U. S. does not have an independent air force; the Army and the Navy each equip and maintain their own air forces. The effort which the U. S. Navy puts into the air forces is great, and from what we hear, the U. S. Navy says that she will complete her air forces attached to the fleet and fight decisive battles with control of the air.

This preparation policy has changed with the years and has, of course, become larger scale. The latest scale of the plan is said to be to complete about 2200 naval planes with the object of replenishing the naval air forces, but fearing these 2200 could not be finished by 1939, the terminal year of the Vinson Plan, it was first reduced to 1650, and later a plan was set up to build 1900 planes in five years. At present she has about 1500 planes and I think the 2200 planes of the first plan will also be completed by the time the Vinson Plan has been completed.

In addition to the above, the U. S. Army is showing an extraordinary zeal for the air forces, which, it seems, intend to cooperate with the navy by participating not only in army operations but also in naval operations.

TABLE III

OUTLINE OF APPROPRIATION OF EXPENDITURES FOR LAND AND WATER EQUIPMENTS												
A.D. 19--	'25	'26	'27	'28	'29	'30	'31	'32	'33	'34	'35	'36
Unit - million dollars	4.0	2.7	2.7	4.7	5.4	5.2	11.1	12.2	12.5	23.5	16.8	38.1
Note: Out of 38 million dollars, 15 million was devoted to Pearl Harbor in 1936.												

7. Importance attached to the East by the British Navy.

The British Navy, a little different from that of the U. S. or Japan, does not customarily make public comprehensive building programs covering a certain number of years. As she adds or supplements necessary plans each year to the original it is difficult for us to see through to the future, but generally speaking, around the time when the London Treaty was concluded, she was not active in building ships. She was at that time building only about three cruisers, nine destroyers and three submarines yearly. The past two or three years, however, it was suddenly increased and according to the government announcement of last spring, the construction of two capital ships will be started next year and one airplane carrier, five cruisers, over 12 destroyers, some submarines and several non-limitation ships are to be built.

As for the budget, only the estimates for 1936 and 1937 are presented, and how many years are needed after that for the fulfillment of the plan is not made known. At any rate, it can be clearly perceived that her ship-building in the last two or three years has become very active as compared with that of several years preceding. The increase of expenditures is shown in Table IV.

TABLE IV

BUILDING EXPENDITURES OF THE BRITISH NAVY							
Year	1931	1932	1933	1934	1935	1936	1937
In million pounds	6.2	6.0	7.7	9.7	11.5	11.9	16.2

To touch a little on Britain's intention in regard to her war operations in the Oriental area, that is, her naval forces in the Orient and her installations at the important strategic points in the area, in recent years Britain seems to be laying special emphasis on naval strength in the Orient. After the Russo-Japanese War, following the downfall of the Russian Navy, the revision of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, the rise of the German Navy in Europe and so on, Britain gradually reduced her naval forces in the Orient. A long time ago, she had a powerful navy in the Orient, but it was extremely reduced at one time, and needless to say, during the World War her naval power in the Orient was but a small one, for she relied for the most part on the Japanese Navy. After the World War, however, she gradually augmented the strength and in recent years in the Orient she holds one airplane carrier, 7 cruisers (10,000 ton cruisers of the latest type) - she only has 15 in all, but out of her total of 15 cruisers, 7 are allotted to the Orient - as well as 15 Class-B cruisers. Destroyers and submarines have been attached to this nucleus, not including the gunboats for the use on the Yangtze.



Taking all these into consideration, it is obvious that the strength is far more full and strong than in the past. And, moreover, the ships are new, and it seems that in many cases cruisers, destroyers, submarines, or whatever ships they may be, when newly built, are first sent to the Orient. Besides the naval forces, she lays much stress on the solidification and strengthening of strategic points, making a chain from Gibraltar-Malta-Suez Canal in the West, and Aden-Colombo-Singapore-Hongkong and so on in the East, furnishing fuel oil tanks and other installations in the ports.

Among these ports, the one on which the biggest importance is laid is Singapore. The plan was at the outset a considerably big one, but at the time of the Labor Cabinet it seemed as though it was temporarily stopped, but later, especially after the outbreak of the Manchurian Incident, the plan was resumed with some additions. It is said that Britain has been making strenuous efforts for its realization in recent years. I hear that the money already poured into Singapore is about £15,000,000, but she is still carrying out, step by step, her plan and the construction of her installations; moreover, it is said the work is nearing completion, the drydock being already finished, and 1,000,000 ton fuel-supply facilities, repair shops, armouries, fort barracks, and so on, which have been planned hitherto, to be completed around the end of this year. And it is supposed that additions will be made to the plan in the future. It is reported that despite the fact that Hongkong is situated within the defense restriction zone, it is being considerably strengthened.

#### 8. British Air Force Rapidly Growing.

The British air force grew rapidly during the Great War. At one time later, however, it showed signs of decline, compared with those of France, Italy, and others. But recently Britain has begun to put great efforts into the air force. According to the announcement made by the government at the end of last year, Britain aims to have a strength of 1750 planes, and actually her whole air force around the end of last year was reportedly about 1300 planes already. We can see the recent rapid increase in her budget by looking at her air force expenditures shown in Table I.

#### 9. Far Eastern Navy of Soviet Russia

Besides the above, there are problems concerning the state of the navies of France, Italy, Germany and of Soviet Russia, with which we have an important relationship in the Far East. If I enter into these problems, my talk will become too detailed, and, considering the fact that if our navy manages to cope with the British and U. S. navies, those of the other Powers can be taken care of, I should like to refrain from speaking on those navies today. Yet we cannot entirely ignore the fact that Soviet Russia has begun to increase her naval installations rapidly in recent years and, therefore, we have a great concern for the Russian Navy.

At present, Russia has about 50 submarines in the Orient. Russia apparently has about 120 submarines in all, of which about 50 are assigned to the Far East. Moreover, she has 6 destroyers, which are not worth mentioning, and some so-called high speed torpedo boats, which are of a very small type of several tons of tons, probably used as submarine chasers on some occasions and as torpedo boats on others. She has about 100 of these high speed torpedo boats in all at Vladivostok and there is no denying that these will have a considerable power of restraint upon the Japanese navy in case Russia takes the defensive. However, the power of a navy or the command of the sea is not constituted by submarines or torpedo boats alone. It can't be maintained without a well balanced navy with big ships as its center. The torpedo boats and submarines may have value as defensive forces, but, as far as the command of the sea in the Orient is concerned, these ships have, I believe, no chance of victory over the Japanese navy.

#### 10. Japanese Naval Armament Policy

Taking into consideration the aforesaid international situation and the actual status of the navies of other Powers, what policy should our navy take for its armament? I will speak a little on this matter.

As I have stated above, Japan, for her part, has no intention whatever to incite a shipbuilding competition even if a no-treaty era should set in; she aims at possessing the minimum invincible force. At the recent naval reduction conference, Japan claimed the maximum equal ratio, which other Powers opposed, saying that Japan does not have the strength enough to possess an equal ratio with Britain and the U. S. and that each Power has its particular geographical condition. In other words, it has specific weakness in the so-called national defense, but Japan has little weakness in this point, while Britain and the U. S. have many weaknesses. To have equal military force, ignoring such difference in weakness, cannot be said to be non-threatening nor non-aggressive. It will only lead to inequality in the feeling of safety. For these reasons, the Powers opposed the Japanese claims, but we of the navy firmly believe even now that we were not wrong in making such claims.

#### 11. Invulnerable Defense Lines in the Western Pacific.

It is too officious to say that it would be a luxury for Japan to have the degree of armaments as Britain and the U. S. without having enough national power. They may say so privately, but to discuss in such a way at an international gathering is not permissible. Furthermore, although we cannot say that there is absolutely no weakness in our national defense, weakness mainly arises in case of aggression. In other words, we can say that weakness will be considerably decreased if only we maintain the defensive attitude. If each Power admits the principle of safeguarding herself and of non-aggression, I believe that each Power can openly and squarely claim the right to possess an

equal number of armaments wherever it may be. I believe it absurd for the first class Powers to say that 60 or 70 per cent of their quota will be enough for us because they will not attack us, notwithstanding the fact that they and we are on equal footing. It would be quite another matter if they forced it on us, but they must consider the difference of Japan's national strength, her national situation and also of her international situation from the time of the former Washington and London Treaty Conferences and the time of the present naval reduction conference held from last year to this year. We were not under any circumstance to be forced to accept their unreasonable demands, and if we are to adhere to our assertion of non-threat and non-aggression from the standpoint that the navy holds an important role, especially as the stabilizing power of the Orient and as the power for assisting the carrying out of Japan's national policy, we cannot but claim that the right of armament of the Powers should be equal.

Although Japan demanded equality of military power at the Disarmament Conference, it does not necessarily mean that Japan will immediately build up a military power equal to those of Britain and the U. S. as her future armament plan. Japan has no intention at all to invade other countries. Japan has no intention of attacking the western coast of the U. S. or of invading Singapore and occupying India in the near future. It suffices that Japan complete her national defense. Concretely Japan will be satisfied to have an actual fighting power that is invulnerable in the West Pacific as compared with that of any naval Power.

To have equal fighting power does not necessarily mean to have ships of the same type, of the same tonnage and in the same numbers. If a country makes aggressive operations it will, of course, be at a disadvantage. Whereas, if Japan strategically fights a defensive war she will be able to make full use of her geographical advantage, and if Japan will fight with her particular geographical conditions, with particular installations added thereto, and the strategy of "awaiting the enemy's fatigue after coming a long distance," she will be able to preserve the security of national defense even without a naval strength (means concrete naval strength) equal to that of the opposing country.

#### 12. New Armament Program of the Japanese Navy.

Such being the case, the necessary military power for national defense has been unofficially decided in our naval armament plan for the future after the various relations have been considered and in accordance with the new situation. I have no liberty to refer to it here, but the program is aimed at replenishing the naval forces by the new replenishing scheme based on the above unofficial decision. The amount of forces which will form the basis of our naval armament as shown in the budget for the next fiscal year is not necessarily to realize immediately the whole of the strength estimated to be necessary for national defense itself.



Since the outbreak of the Manchurian Incident, Japan has been quite busy externally. She has to complete national defense on one hand, and on the other hand to provide security for the people. All these together with other matters in various fields require enormous national expense. The Army especially requires a prompt replenishment of armaments. On the other hand, as the revenue of the treasury will not allow unlimited expenditures, the minimum tolerable amount has been appropriated as naval expenditures for the budget of the next fiscal year. Consequently because of financial reasons, matters of considerable importance, not only from the strength necessary for the national defense power as a standard, but also in the light of this immediate urgent necessity cannot be realized promptly, would have to be put off to some future fiscal years. I feel that we can but wait for some measures to be taken in the future to tide us over these difficulties in accordance with the national finance or the international situation, etc.

Next comes the question of what degree of equipment should be made according to the new armament plan. I regret to say, we cannot give you the concrete figures today, as we must consider the new London Treaty concluded between Britain, the U. S. and France, the special armament reduction agreement concluded at the Anglo-Russian Meeting, as well as the Anglo-German naval agreement which Germany concluded with Britain last year, all of which will naturally have relation to the new armament reduction of this year, I believe.

In addition to the above, Britain is making vigorous efforts to induce all Baltic border states to come under her control and is trying to restrict their naval armament. Therefore, in the near future the new armament reduction treaty concluded this year will have the effect of restricting the European countries and the U. S. at least.

### 13. Significance of Agreement on Notification of Shipbuilding.

In short, the new London armament reduction treaty concluded this year consists of two parts, i.e., substantial reduction and notification of shipbuilding. Speaking in detail, although there may be some difference in substantial reduction as compared with the former Washington and London Treaties, we will not be greatly mistaken if we say it has been concluded for the most part after the spirit of these treaties. But the shipbuilding notification is considerably different in method from that stipulated in the former treaties, that is, the main part consists in mutual secret notification of shipbuilding among the nations concerned.

Consequently, it is so constituted that non-treaty Powers cannot know the shipbuilding policies or programs of the treaty Powers. As for the method of notification, the Powers are to notify secretly the countries concerned between January and April of the shipbuilding program planned to be put into

practice during the current calendar year, the items of notification to include the types, number, and the maximum calibre of cannon to be installed on the ship. Just before construction work is begun further details are to be made known, these items being the type, important measurements, horse power, and speed of the ship and the armaments to be installed on the ship. The most precise notification is required in regard to the last item, i.e., the number of cannon, torpedoes, machine guns, planes, catapults, and search lights. And the building work cannot be begun until four months after the notification to the countries concerned. If any changes should be made in the principal items during the construction, the work on the changes cannot be begun until four months after the arrival of notifications thereof to the countries concerned as in the above. The provisions are strict to this extent.

#### 14. Reasons why it cannot be made Public.

This is, in short, the device of Britain and the U. S. to check the weak naval Powers, and by means of this device the two countries intend to watch an opponent country so that it will not get ahead of them. The provisions have been made as a means for the strong naval Powers to suppress the weaker naval Powers. At any rate, as Japan has not participated in the Treaty, she has no idea of what shipbuilding plans the U.S. and Britain have, nor of course the contents thereof. Under such circumstances if Japan follows her customary way of making public too early what types of ships will be constructed and in what numbers, the total number, the total tonnage and total expenditures, and so on, according to the new replenishment plan, it would be nothing but showing our hand to others without seeing the other's hand. Such foolishness can absolutely not be tolerated.

In demanding a considerably larger amount of expenditure of the Diet and its approval thereof, the Imperial Navy almost gobbles up the budget without making any full explanation, and without acquiring the understanding of either the Diet or the people at large. This is indeed regrettable and, of course, against our principles, but, the situation of the Powers being such at present, please understand that we unfortunately cannot make public the contents of our plan at this time. However, once a ship is completed, one can know the approximate size of the ship, or of the cannon on the ship, though the details may not be known. The main reason for not making them public is that it is unprofitable for us to let the other Powers know too early the future shipbuilding policy of our navy, whose armaments and materials are making rapid progress from day to day.

#### 15. Analysis of Naval Budget for 1937.

The total amount appropriated for the next fiscal year in the naval budget is a little over ¥681,000,000, a total increase of about ¥129,000,000 compared with that of the working budget of last year, which was ¥551,000,000. To select the important items from among the increased expenditures, among the ordinary expenditures there is a maintenance expense for new ships totalling

¥9,480,000. This is a customary one and covers the expense of maintaining the ships to be completed during the fiscal year of 1936, i.e., till the end of March, 1937, and all these ships are included in the secondary replenishment program.

Then comes the air force units maintenance expense totalling ¥9,630,000, which is for the increase of air units in accordance with the secondary supplement program and will be completed in the next fiscal year. With these, the secondary supplement program will be completed for the most part, and a small part will be left over for the following fiscal year, which will appear in the 1938 budget as a normal increase.

Next come the expenditures to maintain aircraft weapons, a little more than ¥2,270,000. In the navy the so-called air units are those on the land, and the maintenance expenses for aircraft carried on board aircraft carriers and other ships are appropriated separately. Last comes the expenditure for the testing of shipbuilding and armaments, which amount to ¥1,500,000. It is the case, I believe, with not only the navy but in all fields throughout Japan that techniques are always following and running after those of other Powers and it is to be regretted that there has been much imitation and that fundamental research has been lacking. As fundamental experiment and research has been lacking hitherto in the Navy also, the various methods tried usually ended in failure or did not get good results. Therefore, a considerable amount of expenditures has been demanded in the budget for the next fiscal year for experiment and research on all kinds of facilities. In the extraordinary expenditures there is shipbuilding expenditure totalling ¥60,000,000, in which is included the first year allotment of the new supplementary program amounting to about ¥48,000,000, the balance of ¥12,000,000 being the additional expenses arising from the change in the first and second supplement programs.

In addition to this, the allotment for the last year of the supplement program is a little over ¥150,000,000 in the 1937 budget. Together with the newly requested ¥60,000,000, it totals ¥210,000,000 which constitutes the shipbuilding expenses for 1937.

Next comes the expenditure needed for the installations of the Mechanical Engineering Board. As the docks and the various arsenals are of the old type and are inefficient, ¥33,950,000 has been appropriated as miscellaneous improvement expenditures, while ¥9,000,000 has been set aside as necessary for the equipment of Munitions Department, the biggest expense of which is for the additional building of heavy oil storages. The navy has up to now stored liquid fuel as an emergency measure, and has a considerable amount stored today, but it is in no way sufficient to meet the demand of war operations. From the beginning of this year the fuel question has become very grave. Officials and citizens of all fields connected with this problem are deliberating the question and will work according to the national fuel policy. Therefore a considerable amount has been appropriated in the budget of the Commerce and Industry Ministry for the coming year as expenditure for the national fuel policy, but the substitute fuel industry cannot realize in two or three years even the annual



production of only 2,000,000 tons, and I think that vigorous efforts will be needed to increase production to 2,000,000 tons in six years as planned. And even if two million tons are produced according to plans, when viewed from the demand and supply of the past years, that amount only corresponds to the normal amount of increases in that number of years, and therefore the amount to be imported from abroad will not show any remarkable decrease as compared with the present, it is expected. Consequently, the navy cannot stop immediately storing oil even if the national liquid fuel policy is set up, and will have to continue its policy of storage for the time being.

Next, the expenditures for the air units' equipment, ¥26,870,000, is for the equipment of 5 air units to be started in the next fiscal year in connection with the supplementary program for the next fiscal year. The expenditures for the overhauling of ships are ¥36,870,000. Though the overhauling of the capital ships has been for the most part completed by 1936, that of aircraft carriers and other auxiliary ships still remains to be done, and the above expenditure is for these.

Lastly, the expenditure of ¥18,950,000 is for the completion of munitions, including arms, ammunitions, fuels, and so on, but the majority of it is for the purchase and storage of liquid fuel. Besides the above, expenditures for the Manchurian Incident and for the grand maneuver and others are to be found in the budget, but I shall omit them for they are not worth explaining.

#### 16. Equilibrium in the Drafting of the Naval Armament Program.




In connection with the supplement program, I have a while ago stated a general idea that Japan has no intention of inciting shipbuilding competition; and now I should like to speak on it in figures.

In the new armament program we have at present already rid ourselves of the notion of ratio on which many discussions were held in connection with the Washington and London Treaties. Although there is no other way of comparing a completed strength than by percentage, such as the percentage of a certain type of ship out of the total tonnage of ships, we do not fix a percentage first and then fill up the content thereof in order to decide on our own military power. It is, of course, necessary to take into consideration the approximate strength of the Powers in question, since the problem is relative.

Now, considering the relations with the U. S., with our eyes fixed on 1940, the year in which the Vinson Plan and other supplementary plans relating thereto will be completed, we find that the navy of the U. S. is a so-called treaty navy, and will possess the strength stipulated in the Washington and the London Treaties. If Japan had retained the treaty, she would have only built ships to replace her former ones, and the strength would have naturally been fixed. But now, as Japan is not restricted by the treaty, she can decide

on the strength needed, which can be decided naturally by comparing the relative strength of America and Japan, and consider the organization and the unit of all of the forces from a strategic point of view, instead of thinking that our main ships must be 70 per cent of America's, that we must have such and such a percentage of cruisers, etc. In our new armament plan we neither say nor think today that we must have such and such percentage of the armament of the United States. The navy aims at successively adding such units as would build up a navy corresponding to our national strength, from the standpoint of actual war operations. There should be some difference in the results between building up a treaty navy and execution of the new armament policy, which I have just stated. As a matter of fact, they happen to coincide with each other, without the amounts having been equalized intentionally.


17. Investigation of the tonnage of Japanese, British and U. S. Shipbuilding.

Table V does not include the new program, and it is divided in three groups: Japanese, British and U. S. The line  on the left shows the average annual tonnage of ships for the next ten years that would have to be replaced by each Power in the following year in order to maintain the military power, assuming that the past Washington and London Treaties were in existence. According to this table, Japan would have to build about 53,000 tons yearly, Britain, about 33,000, and the U. S., about 70,000. The line  to the right of the above shows the tonnage of ships to be built in the course of 1936: Japan, about 30,000 tons, Britain, about 40,000, and the U. S., about 86,000. Furthermore, the black line  to the extreme right shows the average annual tonnage in the five year period of 1931-1935; Japan, about 22,000, Britain, about 33,000, and the U. S., about 48,000. The latter two lines are added only for reference, and as the lines on the left show, even if the past two treaties had continued to exist, Japan would have to build about 53,000 tons, Britain, about 33,000, and the U. S. about 70,000. Keeping in mind the amount of 53,000 tons as shown in this graph, let us see the average annual tonnage in the programs of five consecutive years as given in Japan's new supplementary program and we will find that it comes far below 53,000 tons. This, I am sure, is statistical proof that Japan has no intention of encouraging a shipbuilding competition even in a naval non-treaty era.

Thus, it is clear that the tonnage of ships to be built according to the new program is actually not more than that it would be if the two treaties were still in effect. Then there probably will arise the question of why the total sum of expenditures in the budget has been increased. This will explain itself if the middle and left lines are compared, that is, the building of capital ships has become a very heavy burden. It is true that the former Washington and London Treaties restricted the whole scale of the navy and, for instance, the building of replacements for capital ships was postponed by prolonging the lives of the ships, and that they would have been effective in temporarily checking the increase of national expenditures at that time. But it is not an

absolute problem; so, owing to the suspension of building capital ships, the naval building expenditures would have to be increased the following year. This increase is not in the least the result of withdrawal from the naval reduction treaty nor of having entered into a non-treaty era.

TABLE V





18. Spiritual gains obtained by withdrawal from Armament Reduction.

With reference to the armament treaty, although we are about to enter into a non-treaty era beginning next year, we have no intention whatever to applaud it merely as a matter of sentiment. I believe that armament reduction is surely effective if it is really done impartially with mutual understanding. But, sad to say, the two treaties of the past were not in the least impartial; they were extremely unfavorable, especially to Japan. Among such unfavorable points, there were, of course, material disadvantages, but there were also extreme spiritual disadvantages. This is not a question of national dignity, but is a question pertaining to the navy itself; it is my personal opinion that undesirable ideas have been implanted in the naval officers for more than ten years, that is, whenever the Disarmament Conference was broadcast, or discussed in magazines and newspapers. We have been told for more than ten years that in order to attack many with little, Japan which has been allowed only a low ratio, should do this, etc. When the senior officers taught the juniors they always encouraged the latter to do their utmost because Japan had limited strength. This has, I fear, unconsciously planted in the heads of officers, especially of the younger ones, the idea that fighting is impossible with an inferior ratio.

Besides, various demands are made by the young men of the fleet with reason that the strength is inferior. This produces a very undesirable effect on the psychology of war. I am of the belief that, to foster a soldier's spirit it is absolutely necessary to give them discipline so as to have an idea of infallible victory even with an inferior strength and to go ahead with a firm determination in that direction. But as we hear always about the reports, discussions of the Disarmament Conference, etc., we compare the strength of both sides and are apt to think that we have no chance of winning because our strength is inferior. I fear this is the most undesirable idea implanted in us soldiers by the Disarmament Conference.

From now on, after our withdrawal from the reduction treaty, we shall not speak of our strength as being only 60 or 70 per cent of that of the U. S., and so on. Of course, if we make comparison, we may say that she has the advantage and that we are inferior, but there is no need to say such a thing now, and the source of discussions comparing each other's strength has for the most part disappeared. Is this not a valuable spiritual gain obtained by our withdrawal from the Disarmament Conference, which in turn has released us from the fetters of the reduction treaty? I also feel that we will have to guide properly the young officers, after taking the above fact into consideration.

19. Lack of Encouragement for Shipbuilding Competition.

Next, I shall speak on the problem of shipbuilding competition. It is difficult to foretell the future on this matter, but in the Pacific the U. S. asserts that she will limit herself to the tonnage stipulated in the two treaties.

of the past and will also stick to the spirit of the treaties. Therefore, we may be justified to think that the U. S. will not begin ship-building competition unless she is stimulated by others. Japan, as the rival of the U. S., has no intention whatever of making armament plans which might threaten the U. S. and incite a shipbuilding competition. As we are of the idea that we will be satisfied with the minimum, with that minimum necessary for the security of Japan's national defense on the sea in the West Pacific, we may be able to say there will be no chance for the rise of a shipbuilding competition between the two states; but, putting aside Japan's idea, how will the U. S. public regard Japan's new armament program? If they conclude from the new program that Japan has begun shipbuilding competition against the spirit of the Disarmament Treaty, and begin the same under the above pretext that is another matter. If their real purport is the preparation of a treaty navy, they may not enter into a competition. But, as I first said, if the fundamental idea of the U. S. is that she does not like Japan's development in the Orient and wants to nip her in the bud as soon as possible, the less said, the better.

#### 20. Probable Start of Competition in Europe.

I cannot make a definite conclusion, but I think, if any shipbuilding competition should arise, that it might be in Europe instead of in the Orient. In Europe a conference was successfully held between Britain and Germany last year. This conference was motivated by the fact that Germany, after declaring a rearmament policy, began to proceed steadily in that direction, and Britain, foreseeing the seriousness of the situation in case Germany should be left to take her own course, wished to oppress Germany. On the other hand, as Germany would not be able to oppose Britain openly for the next ten years, or at least for some time, she wanted, though reluctantly, to go hand in hand with Britain, and thus they came to hold the conference, I believe. Taking advantage of this conference, Britain wanted to hold the Disarmament Conference of last year, and also direct the reduction treaty of this year in the line of the Anglo-German conference, but she was balked in her designs.

Since the Disarmament Conference, Britain has negotiated with Soviet Russia, Poland, Sweden, and other countries. Now Soviet Russia has stood up again. However, Germany, above all, was so exhausted during the Great War and immediately after the war also, that she could not spend money for navy equipment. In recent years, together with France and Italy she has come to make efforts to replenish her navy, thereby driving Britain into a very tough situation. Such being the case, Britain is striving hard to preserve the stand on which she can always remain invincible against any combination of at least two navies, by controlling the various naval countries in Europe.

You are well aware of the recent situation in Europe. I fear it would become serious should complications arise, brought forth by the Spanish problem. Then any country like Soviet Russia or Germany or France may go into a shipbuilding competition, and a stone thrown by one country will directly or indirectly stir the other Powers. Then Britain will not be able to remain a

spectator in the impending emergency, especially as Britain has received no restriction of amount whatever by the new reduction treaty, she can build ships whenever she wants to. Britain and the U. S. are tacitly carrying out things in a sort of parity between themselves, and so if Britain increases her strength it is only natural that the U. S. will do so also. I may be a little mistaken, but I am of the opinion that if shipbuilding competition should arise in the future, the origin will be in Europe instead of in the Orient. And I also feel that it will be caused by none other than the international situation in Europe.

#### 21. Standard for Naval Budget in the Future.

As for our naval budget for the future, if all the Powers enter into shipbuilding competition from the outbreak of some abnormal situation, I can say nothing for certain now; but, otherwise, the navy, though she is not fully satisfied with the strength estimated and required in the new supplement program, will not need an enormous increase in the future budget, which, if we set up a plan by looking into the near future, will be based on the standard of 1937 budget. We also hope to follow it as much as possible. This is confidential between ourselves. The budget which the navy has demanded of the Finance Ministry is not the same as that which has been recognized, and much has been deleted. As some items of considerable importance were eliminated or postponed for future years, it cannot be said that the budget for future years will be the same as that of 1937. It is a matter of course that items of importance will have to be accomplished early, and consequently the budget of later years will have to be somewhat increased, but, generally speaking, I think that you may understand that the estimated expenditures for the navy for the next few years will be based on the standard of the budget for 1937 with some inevitable addition, and this will suffice us for the next several years. We, on our part, also wish to make it suffice as far as circumstances permit.

I shall end my speech here and shall answer your questions if you have any. I thank you very much for your courteous attention.



# C E R T I F I C A T E

I.P.S. No. 903-A

## Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, ODO, Nagaharu hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity:

Assistant Chief, Archives Section. --- Foreign Office

and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 57 pages, dated Jan., 1937, and described

as follows: "Outline of Naval Budget for Fiscal Year 1937 and the General Aspect of National Defense Related to the Navy", a lecture

by Adm. Soemu TOYODA, Chief, Naval Affairs Bureau, Navy Ministry.

I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Archives Section --- Foreign Office ---

Signed at Tokyo on this

1st. day of Oct., 1946.

NAGAHARU ODO

Signature of Official

SEAL

Witness: T. SATO

Ass't. Chief, Archives Section.  
Official Capacity

## Statement of Official Procurement

I, 2d Lt. ERIC W. FLEISHER, O-935000, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above certification was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this

1 day of Oct., 1946

ERIC W. FLEISHER, 2d Lt.  
NAME

Witness: HENRY SHIMOJIMA

Investigator, I.P.S.  
Official Capacity

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Ex 914

通 記 録

日本外交協會第三特別委員會秘密會席上

海軍省軍務局長 豊田副武中將通 (要旨)

十二年度海軍豫算要綱並ニ  
海軍關係國防ノ全貌ニ就イテ

(昭和十二年二月)

日 本 外 交 協 會

本編ハ豊田海軍省軍務局長ガ、當協會第三特別  
委員會 (外交ト海軍關係) 秘密會ニ於テ演述セラ  
レタル要旨ニシテ本協會幹事ノ筆録シタルモノナ  
リ。隨ツテ豊田局長ノ同意ヲ得テ此ニ記ザルモノナル  
ヲ以テ贈寫ノ責任ハ全然本協會ニ在リ。

昭和十一年十二月

日本外交協會關之局

尙本編ハ協會特別委員會委員以外ノ閱讀ヲ禁ゼ  
ルベシニテ之ヲ傳布スル者ハ法律ニ依リテ處ス。

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明年度海軍豫算長綱並ニ  
海軍關係國防ノ全貌ニ就テ

海軍省軍務局長 豊田副武氏 通  
海軍中將

來年度ノ海軍豫算ヲ中心ニシテ海軍ヲ考ヘテ居  
ルコトヲ述べル機會ヲ與ヘラレタコトヲ光榮トス  
ル。匆忙ノ間テ十分極マツタ準備モ出來ズ、オモ  
キ苦シイコトト思フガ、後刻御質問並ニ御批判ヲ  
承リタイ。

話ノ順序ハ、現在ノ國際情勢ト帝國海軍ノ立場、  
英米海軍其他列國海軍ノ近況、次ニ此ノ國際情勢  
ト列國海軍ノ近況ヲ基礎ニシテ、將來ノ帝國海軍  
軍備ノ方針ガドウ云フモノデアルカ、ソノ軍備ノ  
方針ニ依ツテ出來タ來年度ノ海軍豫算ノ演說並ニ  
要點、ヤカマシク簡ハレテ居ル將來建艦競争ガド  
ウ云フヤウニナルカ、之等ノ點ニ關スル私見ヲ述  
ベ、ドウ云フ將來ヲ見透シテ帝國ノ海軍豫算ハ今  
後ドウナツテ行クカト云フ關係ヲ述べテミタイ。

一 無條約ニ對處スル信念

昨年暮カラ本年ノ初メニ對ケテロンドンテ行ハ



レタ軍備會議ヲ、帝國ハ不脅威不侵略ノ根本方針  
 ニ則ツテ、海軍ノ軍備ヲ出來ルダケ僅少シ、政體  
 的ノモノヲ減ラシテ防禦力ヲ強化シ、以テ、外ハ  
 國家的ノ安全感ヲ増進シ、内ハ負擔ノ輕減ヲ圖リ  
 タイト云フ主張ヲ以テ此ノ會議ニ臨ンダノデア  
 ルガ、帝國ノ公正妥當ナ主張モ遂ニ列國ノ容ルル所  
 トナラズ、帝國ハ已ムヲ得ズ此ノ會議ヲ撤退スル  
 コトニナツタ。而シテ茲旬日ヲ出デズシテ帝國ノ  
 關スル限リハ海軍無條約時代ニ入ルコトニナツタ  
 ノデア  
 ルガ、軍備會議ノ前後ヨリ今日ニ至ルマデ  
 日本政府トシテマタ海軍トシテ、機會アル毎ニ中  
 外ニ聲明シテ居ツタヤウニ、假令今後條約狀態  
 ニナツテモ日本カラ進ンデ建造艦艇ヲ發賣スルト  
 カ他國安全ヲ脅威スルヤウナ事ハ考ツテキナイ。  
 マタ將來モ堅ク此ノ信念ヲ以テ海軍ノ軍備ヲ進メ  
 ル心得テ居ル。併シ假令建造競争ヲ進ンデハ誘發  
 シナイト云フモノ、現下ノ國際情勢ヲ考ヘテ見  
 レバ、海軍ノ軍備ガ其ノ國ノ國策遂行ニ重大ナ關  
 係ヲ有スル點カラシテ、タダ無爲ニ形勢ヲ觀望シ  
 テ軍備ヲ放棄スルコトハ出來ナイカラ、事態ヲ能  
 ク觀測シテ之ニ應ズル計畫ヲ考テナケレバナラヌ  
 コトハ言フ迄モナイ。

日本ヲ中心ニシタ現下ノ國際情勢ハ、嘗日本外交協會ノ使命トシテ居ラレル研究項目デアリ、閣下各位ノ能ク御承知ノコトデ、寧ロ私ノ方ヨリオ教ヲ乞ハナケレバナラヌ點デアルカラ、細カイコトハ述ベナイガ、滿洲事變ガ勃發シ、マタ一昨々年ハ國際聯盟ヲ脫退シテ、今日迄ノ外交上ノ經過ヲ色々考ヘテ見ルト、日本ノ對外的ノ國防ハ日ヲ逐フテ其ノ切要ト困難トヲ加ヘテ居ルノデハナイカト思フ。ソノ間一張一弛ハアツタガ、決シテ現在ノ事變ヲ以テ將來安心シテ可ナリトハ言ヘナイ。

#### ニ英・米・蘇・支ヲ中心ニ

日本トシテ對外的ニ最モ意ヲ注ガナケレバナラヌノハ、英・米・蘇・支ノ四ヶ國ガ大体中心ニナルノデハナイカト思フ。ソヴイエツトニ付テハ我が海軍ハ直接關係ヲ持ツテキナイガ、間接ニハ無論關係ガ色々アル。併シ英米ニ比較スレバ海軍トシテハ關係ガ薄イ。此處デ立入ツテ述べルコトハ差控ヘルガ、ソヴイエツトニ對シテ陸軍ガ軍備ヲモツト充實シナケレバナラヌト云フコトハ我々ノ十分了解シテ居ルトコロデアル。併シ日本ノ對外政策ヲ遂行シテ行く上ニ邪魔モナルモノハ何カト云ヘバ、ソレハ決シテ

903-5

軍ニソグイエツトダケトハ限ラナイ。英米ニ對シテハ  
海ニ大キナ關心ヲ持ツテキナケレバナラスト思フ。  
英米ノ海軍軍備ニ假シテ今日デモサウ云フ結論ガ下  
サレルト思フ。イギリスハ、印度ハ勿論ノコト支那  
ニ重大ナル權益ヲ持ツテ居ツテ、コノ權益ヲ保護ス  
ル爲ニハ十分ナ勢力ヲ持ツテ之ヲ確保スルコトハ當  
然デアルガ、アメリカハ支那大陸其他東洋方面ニ於  
テハ左程大キナ權益ヲ持ツテ居ラズ、マタ海外投資  
トカ貿易ノ方面ニ於テモ日本ニ比ベレバ左程ノモノ  
デハナイニモ拘ラズ、アメリカガ此ノ數年特ニ滿洲  
事件勃發以來、海軍ノ整備ニ力ヲ盡シテ居ルコト、  
マタ海軍ガドウ云フ姿勢ニ居ルカタ考ヘテミルト、  
アメリカガ如何ナル考ヲ持ツテ居ルカト云フコトハ  
自ラ明瞭デアラウト思フ。ヨクアメリカ人、マタ日  
本人ノ中ニモ、アメリカハ東洋ニ左程大キナ權益ヲ  
持ツテキナイノダカラ、決シテ自分カラ進ンデ日本  
ヲ侵スヤウナコトハ常ニ上考ヘラレヌデハナイカト  
謂ハレルガ、併シ現實ハ逆ニアメリカガ日本ヲ抑ヘ  
ルノニ特別ナ關心ヲ持ツテ居ルト云フコトヲ證明シ  
テ居ルト思フ。戦争ニハ絶對的ノ戦争ト比較的ノ戰  
争ガアル。若シ將來日米相戦フコトガアルトスレバ、  
日本ノ立ツ戦争ハ絶對的ノ戦争デアツテ、生キルカ  
死ヌカノ問題デアルガ、アメリカハ決シテ絶對的デ



ナイ。ツマリアメリカハ自國ノ繁榮ヲ土台ニシテノ  
 戰デアルガ、日本ハ國家存亡ノ問題デアル。サスレ  
 バアメリカガ多額ノ金ヲ使ヒ、色々大キナゼステユ  
 アヲ使ツテ日本ヲ強壓スルコトハ、常體カラ考ヘレ  
 バアリ得ナイコトデアル。然ルニ實際ハソレヲヤツ  
 テ居ル。アメリカノ海軍ハ後ニ勉メルガ、ソノ近年  
 ノ施設ニセヨ艦隊ノ太平洋沿岸ノ問題ニセヨ、イツ  
 レモ日本ヲ牽制シ強壓スル以外ニ目的ハナイ。

要スルニアメリカニセヨイギリスニセヨ、日本ノ  
 東洋ニ於ケル發展ガ彼等ノ氣ニ入ラナイノデアツテ、  
 何トカ之ヲ阻止シヤウ、双葉ノ間ニ芽ヲ刺リタイト  
 云フ考ガ根底ニナツテ居ル。從ツテ國交上ニ色々派  
 生的ニ起ル個々ノ問題ノ如キハ、ソノ都度、情勢ハ  
 色々アラウガ、根本ノ觀念ハ其處ニアル。故ニ我々  
 トシテハ始終ソレヲ頭ニ入レテ置カナケレバナラナ  
 イ。チヨツトシタ顔色ヲ窺ツテ、アメリカガ日本ニ  
 對スル壓力ヲ緩メタトカ、或ハ壓力ガ加ハツテ來タ  
 トカ、ソノ一張一弛ニ動かサレテ大局ヲ誤ラナイヤ  
 ウニシナケレバナラヌ。從ツテ帝國海軍トシテハ決  
 シテ彼ヲ侵スヤウナ意思ハ、少クとも現在ニ於テハ  
 持ツテキナイガ、何トシテモ不敗ノ姿勢ダケハドウ  
 シテモ整ヘテ置カナケレバナラヌ。ソレニ依ツテ初  
 メテ日本ノ對外政策モ保障サレルノデアルト思フ。

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## 日・英・米ノ海軍費比較

次ニ英米海軍ノ近況ニ付テ述ブル。

英・米・日ノ海軍費ヲ比較スレバ、第一表ニ示ス如ク、昭和六年ニハ滿洲事變が勃發シ、同七年ハ上海事變がアツテ、日本ハ之が爲ニ昭和七年ニハ追加豫算等テ三億ニ上リ、爾後年々増加シテ居ル。之ハ國際情勢ノ緊張ニ應ズル爲ニ已ムヲ得ズ歟ツタ措置が豫算ニ現ハレテ居ルノデアル。之ニ對應シテ英米モ過去三年間グライ海軍豫算が急激ニ膨脹シテ居ル。

## 米國建造計畫ト其ノ現状

アメリカノ近年ノ建造計畫及ビ其ノ進捗状況ハ第二表ニ示ス通りデアル。アメリカハ大体日本ノ海軍ノヤリ方と同様ニ、或ル年數ヲ限ツテ統合的ノ建造プログラムヲ着テテ居ル。但シ豫算ハ、日本ト違ツテ繼續的デナク、年々所要豫算ヲ計上シテ居ル。從ツテソノ時々ノ財政狀態ニ依ツテプログラムハ決ツテ居ツテモ、必ズシモ其ノプログラム通りニハ進ンテ行カナイコトが屢々アル。現在着テテ居ル量モ大キナモノハ、一九三四年ニ對テタダインソン線、百二隻約二十萬噸、八億ドルデアツテ、之ガ一九三九

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第一表

		海軍費 (單位百萬)						
		昭和5年	昭和6年	昭和7年	昭和8年	昭和9年	昭和10年	昭和11年
米	海軍	383	360	329	406	455	482	527
英	海軍	52.6	51.6	50.5	53.6	58.8	67.8	84.1
日	海軍	17.9	18.1	17.4	17.4	20.4	30.8	55.2
日	海軍	263	211	307	404	489	530	550

第二表

建造計畫及其ノ進捗状況

○ダイソンソノ案 一九三四年計畫

百二隻 約二〇萬圓 八億弗 (一九三九年迄ニ終了豫定)

◎産業復興費ニ依ル 一九三三年計畫

三十二隻 約十二萬圓 二億三千八百萬弗

◎一九一六 一九二九年計畫ノ残部 (ニシテ一九三三年以後起工)

十一隻 約三萬五千圓 約一億二千萬弗

以上ノ計畫ノ内

未起工 約六十八隻 十一萬五千圓 (ダイソンソノ案中ノ一部)

建造中 約六十三隻 二十三萬三千圓

其ノ他 八隻工

建造費

昭和	年	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
單位	百萬弗	四六・四	三八・三	五二・九	六〇・〇	六二・三	六三・三	六六・五



年マデニ終了ノ豫定デアルカラ一九四〇年ニハ完成  
 スル。ソノホカニ、其ノ前年ニ應急計畫トシテ産業  
 復興費デ、三十二億、約十二萬噸、二億三千八百萬  
 ドルノ費ヲ要ツテ之モ實行シテ居ル。モウ一ツハ、  
 一九一六年カラ一九二九年マデニ満足シタマヘテ  
 海軍ノ充實計畫ヲ行テテ居ツタガ、ソレガ一九二九  
 年マデニ總テ完成セズ、一九三三年以後ニ、十一隻、  
 約三萬五千噸、約一億二千萬ドルノモノガ要ツテ居  
 ル。コノプログラムモ目下進行中デアル。以上ノ計  
 畫ノ中、未起工ノモノガ、約六十八隻、十一萬五千  
 噸、建造中ノモノガ約六十三隻、二十三萬三千噸テ  
 アツテ、其他ハ全部既ニ竣工シテ居ル。ソノ艦船建  
 造費ハ海軍豫算ノ全部デハナイ。建造費ハ昭和六年  
 ニハ三千八百萬ドルデアツタモノガ段々増エテ、昭  
 和十年ニハ二億ドルヲ超ユルニ至ツタ。昭和十一年  
 度ハ一億六千八百萬ドルニナツテキル。之ハアメリカ  
 ガ艦タ言フ條約海軍ノ完成、即チワシントン・ロン  
 ドン兩條約ヲ規定サレタ條約量ノ造船ヲ之テ準備ス  
 ル計畫ニナツテ居ル。從ツテ之ガ無事ニ進行スレバ  
 一九四〇年ニハアメリカノ海軍ハワシントン・ロン  
 ドン兩條約ヲ規定サレタ兵力量ヲ大体保有スルコト  
 ニナル。コノ中ニハ勿論新造ノ足ラヌ部分ノ補充モ  
 アルガ、舊艦ノ代換建造ノ部分モ入ツテ居ル。ナホ

コノホカニ、マダ公報ハ我々ノ手ニ入ツテキナイガ  
 新規計費トシテハ、戦艦ガ二隻、乙級巡洋艦十二隻  
 ラ主ニシタ計費ガ進ンデ居ルヤウデアアル。ソノホカ  
 側駆外洋艦艇ハ待機艦等ガアル。今年ノ豫算ニ二十  
 二萬圓ノ計費ヲ出シタガ、之ハ審議未了ヲ議會ニ採  
 擇サレナカッタ。イツレニシテモ現在アメリカノ海  
 軍ハ一九四〇年マデニワシントン・ロンドン兩條  
 約ヲ決メラレタモノヲ保有スト觀テ差支ヘナイ。コ  
 ノ計費以上ニ海軍ヲ擴張スル意思ガアルカナイカト  
 云フコトハ判ラナイガ、議會其他色々ナ場合ニ政府  
 ノ責任者ガ述ベテ居ルトコロニヨレバ、アメリカハ  
 何處マデモ過去ノ二條約ヲ尊重スルノダ。ソレ以上  
 ニ海軍計費ヲ増加スル意思ハナイト申シテ居ルガ、  
 今後ノ事態ノ變化ニ依ツテハ、何トモ判ラナイ。大  
 体茲四五年前ハワシントン・ロンドン條約ニ規程サ  
 レタ兵力量ヲ標準ニシテ海軍ノ兵力整備ヲ斷行スル  
 モノト觀テ大ナル簡便ヒヘナイト思フ。

#### アメリカノ太平洋作戦施設

次ニアメリカノ太平洋作戦關係ノ施設ニ付テ述ベ  
 ル。アメリカガ太平洋方面ノ水陸設備ニ近年非常ニ  
 力ヲ入レテ居ルコトハ概メテ顯著ナ事實デアアル。ワ  
 シントン條約ノ後ニ二十年計費テ太平洋方面ノ水陸

設備ヲ改善スル目的ヲ以テ、一億三千萬ドルノ費  
 テ着手シテ居ツタガ、其後財政緊縮等ノ關係デ余リ  
 目星シ不モノハナカッタ。亦陸ノ吳淞灣ノ整備ノ如  
 キハ力ヲ注イダガ、其他ニ顯著ナ現象ハ見エナカッ  
 タ。トコロガ滿洲事變ガ勃發スルヤ俄然アメリカノ  
 費度ガ變ツテ來タ。即チ海軍費算モ増加スルシ、ソ  
 レ以外ニ産業復興費ニ使ツテ太平洋ニ非常ニ力ヲ入  
 レテ來タ。其中最モ力ヲ入レテ居ルノハ亦陸ノ吳淞  
 灣デアル。之ニ今日マデ入レタ金ニ付テノ詳細ナル  
 數字ハ只今手許ニナイガ、最近ノ一九三六年ノ例デ  
 モ、水陸施設費三千八百萬ドル中一千五百萬ドルヲ  
 吳淞灣ニ入レテ居ル狀態デアル。而シテ大体八九割  
 程度ハ終ツテ完成ノ域ニ近イト聞イテ居ル。現ニ昨  
 年海軍大演習ガ太平洋方面デアツタガ、全陸陸ガ同  
 時ニ吳淞灣ニ入ツテ補給・休養ヲヤツテ居ル。今後  
 モマダ吳淞灣ニ力ヲ入レ、例ヘバフローディング・  
 ドックヲ二ツ造ル計畫ガアル。コノフローディング・  
 ドックハ頭ヲ尖ラシテ曳船ニ堪ヘ、且ツ自力航行ガ  
 出來ル。ハツキリトハ判ラナイガ、兎ニ角サウ云フ  
 物ヲ造ツテ經費一千萬ドルヲ之ニ注スル計畫ガア  
 ルヤウデアル。之ノ如キハアメリカガ太平洋ノ作戰  
 ニ如何ニ熱心デアルカラ證明スル材料デアル。コノ  
 ホカ本土ノ西海岸ニ於テモ、北カラ言ヘバシヤトル。



サンフランシスコ・ロサンゼルス・サンビトロ・  
 パナマニ施設ヲ増加シテ完全ナル修理・補給・休養  
 ノ方面ニ遺憾ノナイヤウニ駛々進メテ居ルヤウデア  
 ル。滿洲事變勃發以來アメリカノ艦隊ハ引續キ太平  
 洋方面ニ常駐シテ居ツタガ、アメリカニ於テモ亦我  
 々モ、アレヲ何時マデモ置クニシテモ太平洋岸デハ  
 迎モ維持ガ出来ナイノデハナイカト云フコトヲ心配  
 シテ居ツタガ、事實ハ急進ナル水陸施設ニ依ツテ大  
 体西海岸デ停錨シテ居ル。東海岸ニ行クノハ大改造  
 ノ船ガ行ク位デ日常ノ修理、入渠、煙底塗着等ハ總  
 テ西海岸デ圖ニ合セテ居ル。昨年アメリカ艦隊ノ大  
 部分ガ東海岸ニ行ツタ時、ニューヨークノ工廠カラ  
 ヘ職工ガ一人モ艦隊ニ行カナカツタト云フコトヲ聞  
 イテ居ルガ、此ノ事ハ我々日本海軍ニ居ル者カラ云  
 ヘバ信用出来ナイ程ノコトデアツテ、之ハアメリカ  
 ノ造船ガ艦内ニ於ケル工作施設等ガ完備シテ居ツテ  
 自給自足ノ力ガ強イコトノ證明ニモナルガ、一ツハ  
 太平洋岸方面ノ水陸施設ガ完備シテ大艦隊ノ維持修  
 理ニ專ラ俟イテキナイ證明ニモナルト思フ。コノホ  
 カアメリカガ最近方ヲ入レテ居ルノハ北方ノアラス  
 カ・アリューシヤン方面ニ於ケル航空基地ノ整備、  
 氣象ノ調査、或ハアラスカ方面ニ於テハ既ニ陸軍ノ  
 航空部隊ガ出テ訓練ヲシテ居ルガ、北方ノ防備、用

兵站地點ノ整備或ハ調査等ニ非常ニ力ヲ入レテ居ルト云フコトデアル。新クノ如クニシテアメリカガ水陸設備ノ爲ニ近頃入レテ居ル金ハ、第三表ニ示ス如ク一九二五年頃ニハ四百萬ドル位デアツタモノガ近年ハ何レモ一千萬ドルヲ超エ、一九三六年ノ如キハ三千八百萬ドルヲ使ツテ居ル。之ニ依ツテ大體が察セラレル。

#### 米海軍ノ航空勢力

次ハアメリカ海軍ノ航空ニ付テ述ベル。日本モサウデアアルガアメリカハ獨立空軍ヲ持ツテ居ラズ、陸軍ト海軍ト別個ニ航空兵力ノ整備維持ヲシテ居ル。アメリカ海軍ガ航空ニ力ヲ入レテ居ルコトハ非常ナモノデアツテ、我々ノ漏レ爾タ所ニ依レバ、アメリカノ海軍ハ濠洲ニ附隨シタ航空兵力ヲ充實シテ、制空權下ニ於テ決戦ヲヤルノダト稱シテ居ル。コノ整備ノ方針モ、年ト共ニ色々變リ、マタ増加シテ居ルガ、最近ノ規模ハ、海軍ノ航空兵力整備ヲ目的トシテ、海軍機約二千二百ヲ整備スルト言ツテ居ツタガ、併シ此ノ二千二百機ハダインソン系ノ一九三九年迄ニハ出來サウモナイノデ一應一千六百五十機ニ改メ更ニ後ニ一千九百機ヲ五年間ニ造ルト云フ計畫ヲ行テタガ現在ハ約一千五百機ヲ持ツテ居リ、最初ノ目

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第 三 表

水陸施設費充當ノ概要												
西曆 19 一 年	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36
單 位 百萬弗	4.0	2.7	2.7	4.7	5.4	5.2	11.1	12.2	12.5	23.5	16.8	38.1
註 = 1.936年 3800萬弗中 東京港 1500 萬弗充當												



的デアール二千二百機モ大体ダイソンソ集完成ノ時ニ  
出来上ルノデヘナイカト思フ。コノホカニアメリカ  
ノ陸軍モ航空ニ非常ニ力ヲ注イテ居ツテ、ソノ意氣  
込ニ於テハ、將來ハ陸軍方面デナシニ海軍ノ作戰ニ  
モ陸軍ガ積極的ニ参出シテ其ノ作戰ニ呼應シヨウト  
云フ意旨ヲ持ツテ居ルヤウデアール。

#### ハ 英國海軍ノ東洋重視

イギリスノ海軍ハアメリカヤ日本ト少シ違ツテ流  
合シタ或ル年數ノ廣イタ建造プログラムヲ發表シテ  
イノヲ例トシテ居リ、年々ノ計畫ヲ進キ足シ々々々  
々テ居ルノデ、ハツキリシタ將來ノ見通シガ付キ兼  
ネルガ、大体ロンドン條約締結前後アタリハ活潑ナ  
建造ヲシテ居ラナカツタ。量トシテハ、巡洋艦三隻、  
驅逐艦九隻、潛水艦三隻グライタ毎年造ツテ居ル狀  
況デアツタガ、コノ二三年來急ニ増加シテ、今春政  
府ノ發表ニ依レバ、明年中ニ、主力艦二隻ヲ起工ス  
ル外、航空母艦一隻、巡洋艦五隻、驅逐艦十二隻以  
上、潛水艦其他制限外艦若干隻ヲ建造スル。豫算  
トシテハ一九三六年及ビ一九三七年ダケガ上ガツテ  
居ツテ、後ノ何年間ニ之ダケヲヤルト云フコトが判  
ツテキナイガ、イツレニシテモ過去數年ニ比ベルト  
一兩年來活潑ナ建造ヲ始メタコトハ明ラカニ看取サ

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第 四 表

英 國 / 建 造 費							
昭 和 年	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
單 位 百 萬 磅	6.2	6.0	7.7	9.7	11.5	11.9	16.2

レル。サウシテ艦船建造ノ經費ハ第四表ニ示ス如ク増加シテ居ル。

イギリスノ東洋方面ニ對スル作戰上ノ意圖ト云フカ、在東洋ノ海軍兵力、其他東洋方面ニ對スル作戰線上ニ在ル要地ノ施設ニ付テ述べレバ、近年在東洋ノ海上兵力ニハ餘程特別ノ力ヲ入レテ居ルヤウニ見エル。日露戰爭後ハ、ロシヤ海軍ノ没落、日英同盟ノ改訂、マタヨロツパ方面ニ於テハドイツ海軍ノ勃興等ニ應レテ、東洋方面ノ海上兵力ヲ段々増加シテ來タ。ズット以前ハ中々大キナモノヲ持ツテ居ツタガ、一時ハ非常ニ減シテ、世界大戰中ハ勿論ノコト、日本ノ力ニ多クヲ依頼シテ、其ノ勢力ハ大シタモノデナカッタガ、世界大戰後ニ段々内容ヲ増加シテ來テ、近年ハ東洋方面ニハ、航空母艦一隻、巡洋艦（シカモ一萬噸巡洋艦ノ長モ新シイモノ）七隻、イギリス全体デハ十五隻シカ持ツテ居ナイノデアルガ其ノ十五隻ノ中ノ七隻ヲ東洋ニ廻シ、乙級巡洋艦十五隻、之等ヲ基幹ニシテ驅逐艦、潛水艦ヲ附ケ、其他長江衝ニ居ル河川砲艦ハ勿論デアルガ、過去ニ比ベレバ内容ガ充實強化サレテ居ル。シカモ其ノ艦艇ハ新シイモノデアツテ、巡洋艦ニセヨ驅逐艦、潛水艦ニセヨ、完成スルト先ヅ東洋ニ最初ニ持ツテ來ルコトガ非常ニ多イヤウデアル。ナホ海上兵力ノミ



ナラズ東洋方面ニ對スル兵要地點ノ施設充實強化ニモ非常ニ力ヲ入レテ居ツテ、西ハジブラルタルカラマルタ、スエズ運河ヲ通ツテ、アデン・コロンボ・シンガポール・香港等ハ一ツノチエーインニナツテ、重油タンクヲ造リ、其他ノ施設モ出來テ居ル。之等ノ個所ノ施設ノ中デ最モ力ヲ注イデ居ルノハシンガポールデアル。之ハ初メハ相當大キナ計畫ヲ始メタノデアルガ、其後勞働黨内閣ノ際ニ之ヲ一時中止スルヤウナ形モアツタガ、マタ其後變ツテ、殊ニ南洲要領ガ殆マツテカラハ計畫ヲ進キ足シシテ、最近ハ關連的ノ進捗ヲ圖ツテ居ルヤウニ見エル。今日マデシンガポールニ注込ンダ金ハ約一千五百萬パウンドト云フコトデアルガ、ナホ之以上着々ト計畫施設ヲ進メテ居ルヤウデアル。シカモ其ノ進捗狀態ハ大体完備ニ近イ。乾船渠モ完成シテ居ルシ、百萬噸ノ燃料ノ供給施設、修理工場、兵站庫、要塞兵舎等、大体從來計畫ノモノハ本年末グライニ完成シテ、將來ハ更ニ進キ足シラヤルノデハナイカト云フ氣勢が見エル。香港ハ防備制限地帯ニ在ルガ、其ノ内容ヲ相當強化シテ居ルトイフ情報モアル。

#### ハ急速ニ發展スル英空軍

イギリスノ空軍ハ世界大戦中ハ急速ニ發展シタ。

併シ其後フランス・イタリ―等ニ比ベルト一時凋落ノ嫌ヒガアツタガ、最近ハ空軍ニ力ヲ入レ始メテ居ル。昨年末政府ノ公表ニ依レバ、空軍ノ勢力ヲ一千七百五十機ニスルノダト云フコトデ、現ニ昨年末アタリニ持ツテ居ル數ハ空軍全体デ約一千三百機ト聞イテ居ル。ソノ豫算ハ第一表ノイギリスノ空軍費ニ依ツテモ、茲數年來急速ナ増加ヲシテ居ルコトガ判ル。

#### メソグイエツトノ極東海軍

其他、佛・伊・獨・及ヒ東洋方面ニ於テ日本ト重大ナ關係ニ在ルメソグイエツトノ海軍狀況等モアルノデアルガ、アマリ細カクナルシ、帝國ノ海軍トシテハ、大体英米ヲ睨ンデ居レバ、他ハソレテ賄ツテ行ケルカラ、サウ云フ方面ノ海軍ノ内容ニ付テ述ベルコトハ本日ハ控ヘタイト思フ。唯ロシヤノ海軍ハ近年急速ニ整備ヲ始メ、帝國海軍トシテモ全然之ヲ無視スル譯ニハ行カズ、重大ナル關心ヲ持ツテ居ル。現在極東ニ居ルロシヤノ海軍ノ主要ナモノハ、潜水艦約五十隻、ロシヤハ潜水艦ヲ總體デ現在百二十隻ダラキ持ツテ居ルヤウデアルガ、其中五十隻位ガ極東ニ來テ居ル。其他驅逐艦ガ六隻、之ハ大シタモノ

テハナイ。ナホ高速水雷艇ト稱シテ居ルガ、之ハ數  
十噸ノ短ク小サイモノデ、恐ラク、或ル場合ニハ  
潛艇トシテ使ヒ、或ル場合ニハ水雷艇トシテ使フノ  
ダト思ハレル。コノ高速水雷艇約百隻ヲウラジオニ  
持ツテ居ルガ、之等ハロシヤガ守勢ニ立ツタ場合ニ  
於テ日本ノ海軍ニ對シテ相當守備ノ力ヲ持ツコトハ  
争ハレナイ事實デアル。併シ海軍ノ勢力、海上權ノ  
確保ハ、殊ニテ水雷艇ヤ水雷艇ダケデハ出來ナイノ  
デアツテ、何トシテモ大艦ヲ基幹ニシテ均衡ノトレ  
タ海軍ガ爲ラ言フノデ、守勢的兵力トシテハ價值ハ  
アルガ、東洋ニ於ケル海上權ヲ制スル上カラハ日本  
ノ海軍ニ對シテ勝目ハナイト考ヘテ居ル。

## 二〇 帝國海軍ノ軍備方針

新クノ如キ國際情勢ト列國海軍ノ實狀ヲ睨ミ合セ  
テ、帝國海軍トシテハ、然ラバドウ云フ軍備ノ方針  
ヲ定メルカト云フコトニ關シテ述ベレバ、前ニモ述  
ベタ如ク、假令無條約狀態ニハツテモ日本カラ違シ  
テ建造競争ヲ誘發スルヤウナコトハ帝國トシテハ考  
ヘテキナイ。最少限度ニ於テ不敗ノ力ヲ持ツコトダ  
ケヲ目標ニシテ居ル。最近ノ軍縮會議ニ於テ日本ハ  
共通最大限ト云フコトヲ主張シタ。ソレニ對シテ列



強ハ、——共通最大限ト云フテモソレハ無茶ダ。  
 日本ハ英米ニ對抗シテサウ云フ海軍ヲ造ルダケノ  
 力ヲ持ツテキナイデハナイカ。或ハ各國ハ各國特有  
 ノ地理的條件ヲ備ヘテ居ル。所謂國防ニ特異ナ脆弱  
 性ヲ持ツテ居ル。然ルニ日本ハ其ノ脆弱性が少ナク、  
 英米ノ如キハ脆弱性が非常ニ大キイ。ソノ脆弱性ノ  
 差等ヲ無視シテ均等ノ兵力ヲ持ツコトハ決して不膏  
 成、不優越デハナイノダ。却ツテ安全感ノ不均等ニ  
 ナルノダ。——斯ウ云フ理由デ反對シテ居ツタノ  
 デアルガ、日本ノ主張スル所ハ今日ニ於テモ決して  
 間違ヒハナイト我々海軍ノ者ハ確信シテ居ル。

## 一 西太平洋ニ不敗ノ陣

第一日本ハ國力が足ラナイカラ英米ト同ジ兵力ヲ  
 持ツノハ實難ダト言フコトハ餘計ナオセツカイデ、  
 能デサウ云フコトヲ言フトシテモ、國際會議ノ席上  
 テサウ云フコトヲ理由トシテ争フベキデハナイ。  
 マタ國防上ノ脆弱性ハ相對ニナイトハ言ヘナイガ、  
 併シ脆弱性ノ出來ルノハ使前シヤウトスル爲ニ起ル  
 ノデアツテ、自分が守勢ヲ持シテキルナラバ脆弱性  
 ハ若シク少クナルト云フコトが言ヘル譯デアル。  
 各國已ヲ守ツテ他ヲ侵略シナイト云フ見地ヲ容認ス  
 ルナラバ、各國が均等ノ兵備ノ程ヲ持ツコトハ何處

ニ行ツテモ正々堂々と主張シ得ルコトデアルト思フ。  
 オ互ニ對等ノ立場ニ立ツテ、他ノ方ハオ前ノ方ニ攻  
 メテ行カナイカラ六割ヲ宣イトカ七割ヲ宣イトカ言  
 フコトハ、國際的ノ一流國ガ言ヘルベキモノデハナ  
 イ。併シ付ケレバ格別、日本ハワシントン・ロンド  
 ン兩條約ヲ締結シタ時ト、昨年カラ本年ニ對シテ軍  
 總會議ニ臨ンダ當時ノ、國力ニセヨ、國勢ニセヨ、  
 國際的ノ地位ニセヨ、決シテ向フノ無理押付ケラ其  
 ノ受諾シナケレバナラヌヤウナ事變デハナカツタ。  
 殊ニマダ東洋ノ安定勢方、マダ日本ノ國策ヲ遂行ス  
 ル上ニ海軍ノ兵備ガ支障ノ力トシテ重大ナル役割ヲ  
 演ズル立場カラシテ、不脅威、不侵犯ノ主張ニ立ツ  
 ナラバ、ドウシテモ列國ノ軍備權ハ同等デナケレバ  
 ナラスト主張セザルヲ得ナイ。併シ軍總會議デ均等  
 ノ兵力ヲ要求シタカラ、然ラバ直チニ日本ハ將來ノ  
 軍備計畫トシテ英米ト同等ノ兵力ヲ造ルノカト云へ  
 バ、必ズシモサウデナイ。日本ハ決シテ他國ニ對シ  
 テ進攻ノ意思ヲ持ツテキナイ。アメリカノ西海岸ヲ  
 侵ストカハシンガポールヲ侵シテ印度ヲ取ルトカ  
 云フヤウナコトヲ日本ハ少クトモ近キ將來ニ於テハ  
 考ヘテキナイ。日本ノ國土ノ防衛ヲ全ウスレバ宜シ  
 イ。具體的ニ言ヘバ、日本ハ西太平洋ニ於テ如何ナ  
 ル海軍國トモ比較シテ敗ケナイダケノ戰國實力ヲ持  
 テバ宜シイ。 同等ノ戰國實力ヲ持

ツト云フコトハ必ズシモ同進進、同進進ト云ツタヤ  
 ナ意味デハナイ。進進作戦ヲスレバソレタケ進進  
 スルモノニ分ノ懸イコトハ中ニ進モナイシ、マタ日  
 本が戦略的ニ守勢ノ態勢ヲ取ラスルナラバ、日本ノ  
 地理的ノ地位ヲ全體的ニ活用シ得ル點デ、地理的ノ  
 特殊ノ情勢ト、ソレニ加ヘル特殊ノ施設ト、進ニ居  
 ツテ勢ヲ持ツト云フ戰略的ノ考ニ出ルナラバ、日本  
 ハ必ズシモ相手國ト均等ノ海上兵力（有形物ノ海上  
 兵力ノ意）ヲ持ツテ居ナクテモ國防ノ安固ヲ期スル  
 コトが出来ルト考へル。

#### 一 海軍ノ新軍備計畫

ソレテ我が將來ノ海軍ノ軍備計畫ハ、新事態ニ應  
 ジテ重注ノ關係ヲ考慮シ、國防所要兵力ガ内定シテ  
 居ル。之ハ此處ヲ述べる限りデナイガ、ソレヲ基準  
 ニシテ、新補充計畫ニ依リ海軍ノ兵力ヲ充實セント  
 スル次第デアル。

來年度ノ豫算ニ現ハレタ海軍軍備ノ進費ニナル兵  
 力量ハ、必ズシモ決定サレタ國防所要兵力ソノモノ  
 ヲ直ニ實現シヨウト云フモノデハナイ。滿洲事變  
 以來、國外多事デアツテ、國防充實モシナケレバナ  
 ラズ、國民生活ノ安定モシナケレバナラズ、ソノホ



カ各方面ニ色々巨大ナ國費ヲ必要トスル次第デアル。  
 特ニ陸軍ニ於テハ、急速ニ軍備ノ充實ヲシナケレバ  
 ナラス。一方、歳入ニ於テハ無限ノ失費ヲ許サナイ  
 ト云フ狀況デアルノデ、海軍ニ於テモ忍ビ得ル最小  
 限度ヲ計上シテ來年度ノ預算ヲ作成シタ次第デアル。  
 従ツテ國府所要兵力ヲ基準ニスレバ勿論ノコト、當  
 面ノ需要ノ引當ニシテ考ヘテ見テモ、相當重要ナモ  
 ノガ、國家財政ノ爲ニ、直チニ實現出來ズ、將來年  
 度ニ繰延ベラレタモノモアル次第デアルカラ、之ハ  
 國家財政ニ對シテ其他國際情勢ニ應ジテ、將來ノ善處ニ  
 突ツヨリ仕方ガナイト考ヘテ居ル。

然ラバ新軍備計畫デドノ程度ノモノヲ準備スルノ  
 カト云フコトニナルノデアルガ、之ハ具體的ノ數字  
 ヲ今日未ダ發表シ得ナイ時期ニアルコトヲ蓋ダ遺憾  
 ニ思フ。

ソノ理由ハ英米佛三國ノ間ニ締結サレタ新ロンド  
 ン軍備條約、及ビ、最近天幕閣ノ會議ニ依ツテ締結  
 サレタ特別ノ軍備協定並ニ之ニ關聯シテドイツガ許  
 年イギリストノ間ニ決メタ英獨海軍協定等モ自然ニ  
 今年ノ新軍備ニ關聯ヲ持ツヤリニナルト思フ。マタ  
 イギリスハ慣リニバルテック海岸離國ヲ誘引シテ  
 自分ノ傘下ニ置イテ、海軍軍備ヲ續テウツスル工作

ヲシテ居ル。従ツテ近キ將來ニ於テハ、少ナクトモ  
歐列列國トアメリカノ間デハ、大体本年締結サレタ  
新軍備條約ノラインデ拘束スル去リテ来リキルヲ  
ラウト居フ。

### 一 軍備通報協定ノ意義

本年締結サレタ新ロンドン軍備條約ハ、之ヲ要約  
スレバ、實質ノ制限ト軍備通報ノ二ツノ部分カラ成  
ツテ居ル。實質制限ハ、細カク云ヘバ今迄ノワシ  
トン・ロンドン兩條約ト違ツタ所モアルガ、大体ア  
ノ流レヲ汲ンテ出來上ツテ居ルト見テ大キナ間違ヒ  
ハナイ。タダ軍備通報ダケハ往來ノ條約ニ決メテア  
ツタノト大分ヤリ方が違ツタ。ソレハ、通報スルニ  
付テハ關係國ノ間デオ互ニ内容ノ通報ヲスルト云フ  
コトガ主體ニナツテ居ル。従ツテ條約ニ加入シテキ  
タイ國ニハ、條約加入國ノ建艦ノ方針豫定が知ラナ  
イコトニナツテ居ル。ソノ通報ノ仕方ハ、毎年一月  
カラ四月迄ノ間ニ、ソノ曆年度ノ間ニ建造スル建艦  
計畫ヲオ互ノ關係國ニ内容ニ通報スル。ソレハ艦種  
ト隻數ト、ソノ艦ニ搭載スル大砲ノ最大口径ヲ知ラ  
セル。ソレカラ愈々建造ニ或寄ル前ニハ細目ヲ通報  
スル。ソレハ各艦種ニ付テ、艦ノ重要寸法、馬力、  
速力、及ビ搭載スル兵器……コノ搭載スル兵器ノ

如キハ、大砲、魚雷、機銃、飛行機、カタapult、  
 戦艦ノ數マデ、非常ニ細カイ内容ヲ備ヘタモノデ  
 アルガ、ソノ内容ノ詳細ナル要目ヲ關係國ニ内報ス  
 ル。ソノ内報が關係國ニ到着シテカラ四ヶ月経タナ  
 ケレバ建造ニ着手スルコトが出来ナイ。若シ建造中  
 途ニシテ其ノ要目ヲ變更シタル場合ハ、ソノ變更ノ  
 工事ニ着手スルノモ、同ジク内報が到着シテカラ四  
 ケヶ月経タナケレバ着手出来ナイ。新ウ云フ條シイ流  
 定ニナツテ居ル。

#### 一四 何故ニ公表シ得ヌカ

之ハ要スルニ英米が獨小海軍國ヲ領ル手デアツテ、  
 之ニ成ツテ相手ノ出方ヲ始終見テ、先ヲ制サレナイ  
 ヤウニト云フ、優勢海軍國が劣勢海軍國ヲ押ヘル手  
 トシテ新ウ云フ規定が出来タノデアルガ、ソノ目的  
 ハ兎モアレ、日本ハ條約ニ參加シテキナイノデ、英  
 米ガドウ云フ建造計畫ヲ待テ、マタ其ノ計畫ノ内容  
 ガドウ云フモノデアルカト云フコトハ全然判ラナイ。  
 従ツテ斯カル事態ニ於テ、日本ガ從來ノヤリ来リヲ  
 踏襲シテ、新補充計畫ハ、ドウ云フ艦隊ガ何隻、總  
 計ガ何隻、噸位ニシテ何十萬噸、總金額幾ヲト云フ  
 ヤウナコトヲ、通早ニ發表スルコトハ、當局コツテ  
 ノ手ノ中ダケヲ見セテ南フノ手ノ中ヲ知ラナイト云



フコトニナリ、之ハ到底忍ブコトが出来ナイ。

海軍が根柢多額ノ經費ヲ議會ニ要求シテ其ノ協賛ヲ得ルノニ、ソノ内容ヲ精細ニ説明スルコトナク、議會ハ勿論、國民ニモ其ノ瞭解ヲ求メズニ、機密ノヤウナ密着テ豫算ヲ取ルコトハ、海軍トシテ誠ニ心苦シク感ズル次第デアツテ、於シテ本旨トスルトコロデハナイノデアルガ、列國ノ情勢がサウ云フ風デアルノデ、速速ナガラ今直ニ其ノ内容ヲ世間ニ公表シ得ナイ點ヲ御察承取ヒタイ。但シ之モ、艦が出来テシマヘバ、細カイ要目ハ現ラナイニシテモ、何頃ドラキノ艦ヲ大砲ハ何時ト云フコトドラキハ判ルガ、公示セザル主タル理由ハ、算能費外が着々と進捗進シツツアル海軍ノ建造計畫ガドウ云フ方向ニ進ンテ居ルカト云フコトヲ相手面ニ週早ニ示スコトが不利ダト云フ點ニアル。

#### 一 昭和十一年度海軍豫算ノ概略

來年度ノ海軍豫算ハ總額六億八千百餘萬圓デアツテ、昭和十一年度ノ實行豫算額五億五千百餘萬圓ニ較べルト、總額ニ於テ一億二千九百餘萬圓ヲ増加シテ居ル。ソノ増加ノ中ヲ重要ナル事項ヲ摘ミ出デレバ、經常部ニ於テハ、新艦船ノ維持費ガ九百四十八萬圓、

之ハ恒例的ノモノデアツテ、昭和十一年度中即チ昭  
 和十二年即チ昭和十二年三月一杯マデニ完成スル艦  
 船ノ維持費デアリ、コノ艦船ハ皆第二次補充計畫ニ  
 屬シテ居ルモノデアル。ソレカラ航空隊維持ニ要ス  
 ル經費ガ九百六十三萬餘圓、之モ第二次補充計畫ニ  
 差ク航空隊ノ増設デアツテ、來年度ニ完成スルガ、  
 ソノ維持費デアル。之ヲ第二次補充計畫ハ來年度ヲ  
 以テ大体完成シ、アト僅カナモノガ十三年度ニ成ル  
 ガ、併シ之ハ當然増ニナツテ十三年度ニ要ヘルル計  
 デアル。ソレカラ航空兵船維持ニ要ル經費二百二十  
 七萬餘圓、海軍ヲ航空隊ト稱フノハ總テ陸上ノ航空  
 隊ノコトデアツテ、艦載飛行機、即チ航空母艦ソノ  
 ホカ各艦艦船ニ搭載シテ居ル飛行機ノ維持費ハ別ニ  
 取ツテ居ル。ソレカラ造船及造兵設備費百五十萬圓  
 之ハ、從來海軍ノミナラズ日本全体ガサウテナイカ  
 ト思フガ、技術ガ、常ニ列國ノ進歩ニ追隨シテ、追  
 ヒ及ケタタタラヤツテ居ツテ、類似ガ多ク、根本  
 的ノ研究ガ足ラヌト云フ憾ミガ少ナクナカッタノデ  
 アルガ、海軍ニ於テモ此ノ基礎的、根本的ナ實際研  
 究ガ從來十分テナカッタ爲ニ、色々ヤツテモ失敗シ  
 タリ良イモノガ出來ナイト云フ快陷ガアルノデ、各  
 種施設ノ實際研究ノ費用ヲ來年度ハ相當要求シテ居

ル。臨時部ニ於テハ、艦艇建造ニ要スル經費が六千  
 萬圓、コノ中ニ新補充計畫ノ初年度制約四千八百萬  
 圓が入ツテ居ル。理リノ千二百萬圓ハ第一次補充計  
 畫、第二次補充計畫ノ計畫變更ニ基ク追加デアル。  
 ソノホカニ第二次補充計畫ノ最後年制額が十二年度  
 ニ一億五千萬圓餘、之ニ新規要求ノ六千萬圓ヲ加へ、  
 總合計二億一千万圓餘が十二年度ノ艦船建造費ニナ  
 ル。工作應設備ニ要スル經費、之ハドツクトカ各工  
 廠ノ施設が舊式デ能力が擧ガラナイノデ、之ヲ改善  
 スル爲ノ幾多ノ支出が三千三百九十五萬圓、軍需部  
 設備ニ要スル經費が九百餘萬圓、之ハ量モ大キナモ  
 ノハ重油タンクノ増設デアル。海軍ハ從來液体燃料  
 ニ付テハ、蓄積スルコトヲ應急處置トシテヤツテキ  
 タノデ、今日ニ於テハ相當ノ貯藏が出来テ居ルガ、  
 併シ作戦ノ要求カラ云へバ、マダ々々不足デアル。  
 本年ノ初メカラ燃料問題ハ非常ニ大キナ問題トナツ  
 テ、朝野各方面ノ關係者が審議シテ、燃料國策トシ  
 テ來年度カラハ相當ノ經費が商工省ノ豫算トシテ計  
 上サレテ居ツテ、着々ソノ方向ニ進ムコトニハナツ  
 テ居ルガ、併シ代用燃料工業ノ如キハ、年産二百萬  
 噸スラ二年ヤ三年テハ實現出来ナイノデアツテ、計  
 畫ノ如ク六年間ニ二百萬噸ノ増産ヲ圖ルニハ餘程ノ



勢方ヲ要スルト思フ。假ニ其ノ計畫ガ實現シテ二百  
 萬噸ガ増進サレタニシテモ、從來ノ懸念狀態カラ考  
 ヘルト、二百萬噸ト云フノハ大体ソノ年度ニ産エル  
 鐵量ニ相當スル位ノモノデ、海外ノ輸入ニ俟タナケ  
 レバナラス。而ハ現在ト比較シテ著シイ減少ハナイノ  
 デハナイカト考ヘテ居ル。従ツテ海軍トシテハ該國  
 海軍政策ガ假令骨立シテモ今直チニ此ノ貯蔵ヲ停止  
 スルコトハ考ヘラレナイノデアツテ、マダ暫分ハ此  
 ノ貯蔵ノ方針ヲ續ケテ行カナケレバナラス。ソレカ  
 ラ航空機設備ニ要スル經費二千六百八十七萬圓、之  
 ハ來年度ノ補充計畫ニ已ルシテ、來年度着手スル航  
 空機ガ五機アルガ其ノ設備費デアル。ソレカラ造船  
 費ニ要スル經費が三千六百八十七萬圓、主力艦  
 ノ改装ハ大体昭和十一年度ヲ以テ完成シタノデア  
 ルガ、マダ航空母艦ノ改装、其他補助艦船ノ改装モ  
 ツテ居ルノデ、之ニ對スル經費デアル。ソレカラ軍  
 需品整備ニ要スル經費千八百九十五萬圓、之ハ兵  
 糧・医薬・燃料等デアルガ、大半ハ該國燃料ノ消費  
 貯蔵ノ費用デアル。其他補給費并莫トカ大演習費等  
 モアルガ、特ニ内容ヲ説明スルダケノ便宜モナイカ  
 ラ省略スル。

#### 一六 軍備計畫骨立ノ重心

ナホ補充計畫ニ關聯シテ、極ク概念的ニハ既ニ先  
 程、日本ガ通シテ造艦競争ヲ誘發スル意思ハナイト  
 云フコトヲ述ベテ置イタルデアルガ、ソレヲ數字的  
 ニ述ベテミタイ。新軍備計畫ニ於テハ、從來ワシン  
 トン・ロンドン兩條約ヲ總ツテ色々論議サレタ比率  
 ノ觀念ハ今日我々ハ脱因シテ居ルデアツテ、出來  
 上ツタ勢力ヲ比較スルニハ、總噸數デ何が何輦ト云  
 フヤウニ比率デ比ベルヨリ目安ノ付ケ方ガナイガ、  
 自己ノ兵力量ヲ決定スルニハ、決シテ先ツ比率ヲ決  
 メテ其ノ内容ヲ盛り込ムト云フヤウナ行キ方デハナ  
 イ。相對的デアルカラ、大体相手ノ兵力ヲ考ニ入レ  
 ナケレバナラヌコトハ勿論デアル。



茲ニ對米關係ヲ、アメリカノダインソン案其他之  
 ニ關聯シタ補充計畫ガ完成スル一九四〇年ヲ目標ニ  
 シテ考ヘテ見ルト、アメリカノハ大体所謂トウリイ  
 テイ・ノイザイデ、ワシントン・ロンドン兩條約  
 ニ規定シタ兵力量ニ準スル。タカラ若シ日本ガ其ノ  
 條約ニ入ツテ居ツタナラバ、代艦ヲ建造シテ其ノ  
 量ハ自ラ決マツテ來ルデアルガ、日本ハ其ノ條約  
 ニ制限サレナイデアルカラ、必ズシモ主力艦ハ七  
 輦ナケレバナラヌトカ巡洋艦ハ何輦デ行クト云フヤ  
 ウニ考ヘズトモ、アメリカノ相對的ナ兵力ヲ見テ、




之ニ對シ作戰用兵ノ上カラ我が方ノ各部隊ノ編制ヤ  
個々ノ單位ヲ考ヘレバ、ノツカラ兵力が出テ來ル  
ノデアツテ、新軍備計畫ハアメリカノ何割ナセムベ  
ナラヌト云フヤウナコトハ、我々ハ今日テハ言ヒモ  
セズ考ヘテモキナイ。實質的作戰ノ立場ニ立ツテ國  
力ニ應ジタ海軍ヲ造リ上ゲルヤウナ單位ヲ集計シテ  
行クノガ海軍ノ狙ヒ方デアル。従ツテ、條約海軍ヲ  
造ルノト、今通ベタ新軍備方針ヲ遂行シテ行クノト  
テハ、結果ニ違ガアツテ然ルベキデアルガ、故意ニ  
其ノ量ヲ合シタ譯テハナイガ偶然一致シテ居ル。

#### 一 日・英・米ノ造艦量比較

第五表ハ、新計畫ハ入ツテキナイガ、日・英・米  
ノ三グループニ分ケテ、左側ノハ、若シ過去  
ノワシントン・ロンドン兩條約が容認シタト假定シ  
テ各國が來年以後ソノ兵力ヲ維持シテ行ク爲ニハ毎  
年ドノ位ツツ建造シナケレバナラヌカト云フ其ノ代  
換建造量ノ將來十年間ノ一年平均デアル。之ニ依レ  
バ、日本ハ約五萬三千噸、イギリスガ約八萬三千噸、  
アメリカガ約七萬噸ヲ建造シナケレバナラヌ譯デア  
ル。ソノ右ニアルハ昭和十年度ノ造艦量デア  
ツテ、日本ガ約三萬噸餘、イギリスガ約四萬噸、ア




メリカガ約八萬六千噸、更ニ其ノ右ノ  ハ昭和六年乃至昭和十年ニ至ル五年間ノ毎年平均建造量デアツテ、日本ガ約二萬二千噸、イギリスガ約三萬三千噸、アメリカガ約四萬八千噸デアル。 ト

 線ハ  ノ爲ニ附ケタノデアルガ、左ノ  ガ示ス如ク、過去ノ二條約ガ存続シテモ、日本ハ約五萬三千噸ヲ造ラナケレバナラヌシ、イギリスハ約八萬三千噸、アメリカハ約七萬噸ヲ造ラナケレバナラヌ。コノグラフニ示ス日本ノ五萬三千噸ヲ頭ニ入レテ、新補充計畫ニ於テ日本ハドノ位ヲ造ルカト云フコトヲ計算シテミルト、五ヶ年經濟事業ヲ各年平均ニ割ツテ見ルト、五萬三千噸ヨリハ餘程下ガルノデアル。之ハ海軍が無條約狀態ニアツテモ、自ラ進ンテ製造量等ヲ誘發スル意思ガナイト云フ數字的ノ證明ニナル。

然ラバ過去ノ條約ガ存続シタノニ比ベテ、製造量ハ實際ハ多クナイノニ豫算ハ何故違エタノカト云フ疑ガ起ルデアラウガ之ハ  ト  ヲ比較スレバ得ル。主力艦ノ建造ガ非常ニ大キナ負擔ニナツテ居ル。成程從來ハワシントン・ロンドン兩條約ハ、海軍ノ全体ノ規模ヲ制限シ、或ハ戰艦ノ如キハ代艦ノ建造ヲ延期シテ艦齡ヲ延長スルト云フヤウナコト

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第五表



テ、ソノ當時ニ於テハ一時國費ノ膨脹ヲ抑止スル效果ガ確カニアツタト思フガ、併シソレハ絕對的ノ問題デハナイノデアツテ、主力艦ノ建造ヲ中止シタオカテ、來年カラハ建造費ヲ海軍費トシテ種エザルヲ得ナイ。コノ増加ハ決シテ軍備條約ヲ附退シタカラトカ無條約狀態ニナツタカラト云フ結果デハナイ。

### 一ハ軍備附退ノ結果的取扱

テホ軍備條約ニ關聯シテ、來年カラ無條約狀態ニナルノニ、我々ハ決シテ單ナル心持ノ問題トカ何トカテ無條約ヲ驅逐スルト云フ意思ハ毛頭ナイ。若シオ互ノ立場ヲ瞭解シテ本當ニ公正ニヤルナラバ、軍備ノ效果ハ必ズアルト思フ。併シ悉シイ數過去ノ二條約ハ決シテ公正ナモノデハナカッタ。特ニ日本ニ取ツテ甚ダ不利ナモノデアツタ。ソノ不利ナモノノ中デ、物質的ナ不利ハ言フ迄モナイガソレ以外ニ精神的ノ非常ナ不利ガアツタ。之ハ國民ノテイグニテイノ問題デナク、海軍部内ノ問題デアリ又私一個ノ私見デアルガ、過去十數年間ニ好マシカラザル觀念ヲ海軍軍人ニ植エ付ケタト思フ。ソレハ、軍備會議ノ事ガ、屢々發送サレ、報道サレ、新聞雜誌ニ論議サレルト、日本ハ低比率デアルカラ、寡ヲ以テ衆ヲ討ツニハ云々ト、十數年間ソレバカリヲ耳ニシ、上



長ガ部下ニ被ヘル時ニハ、日本ハ兵力ガ少ナイカラ  
 オ前邊ハシツカリヤラナケレバイカヌゾト云フコト  
 ラ常ニ申シテ居ツタノデアルガ、之ガ知ラズ哉ラズ  
 ノ間キ、殊ニ若イ士官ナドノ頭ノ中ニ、劣勢比率デハ  
 戦ガ出来ナイノダト云フ考ガ極エ付ケラレタノデハ  
 ナイカト思フ。其他、艦船部隊ノ若イ人カラ、劣勢  
 ダカラ新ウシテ呉レ、アアシテ呉レト注文ガ出ル。  
 之ガ戦ノ心理ニハ誠ニ好マシカラヌ懸影ニヲ及ボシ  
 テ居ル。軍人ノ精神トシテハ、假令劣勢デモ必ズ勝  
 ツノダト云フ訓練ヲシ、マタ自分ノ決心ヲ固メテ之  
 ニ邁進シナケレバナラヌガ、軍艦會議ノ報道論議等  
 ガ始終アルト、兩方ノ勢力ヲ比較シテ、動モスレバ  
 劣勢デアルガ故ニ勝算ナシト云フ觀念ヲ持チ易イ。  
 之ハ軍艦ガ我々軍人ニ植エ付ケタ最モイケナイ觀念  
 デハナイカト考ヘテ居ル。今後ハ軍艦條約ヲ脱退シ  
 テ、日本ハアメリカノ六割トカ七割ノ劣勢ダト云フ  
 ヤウナコトラ口ニシナイ。比較スレバ彼ガ有利デア  
 リ我ガ劣デアルト言ヘルカモ知レナイガ、ソシナコ  
 トヲ言フ必要ガナイシ、オ互ノ勢力ヲ比較スル論議  
 ノ種ガ大分ナクナツタ。之ハ日本ノ軍艦會議カラ脱  
 退シテ軍艦條約ノ羈絆ヲ脱シタ精神的ノ安穩デハナ  
 イカ。マタ其ノ點ニ目ヲ着ケテ善導シナケレバナラ  
 スノデハナイカト考ヘル。

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一、對日關係之發展

次ニ建艦競争ノ問題デアルガ、之ノ見通シハ困難  
デアルガ、併シアメリカハ太平洋方面ニ於テハ通云  
ノ二條約ノ條約量テ行クノダ。ソノ精神ヲ何處マデ  
モ突張ツテ行クノダト云フコトヲ主張シテ居ル。故  
ニアメリカガ他カラ刺戟サレナイ以上ハ、建艦競争ニ  
乗出スコトハナイト云フコトガ一應ハ考ヘラレル。  
ソノ點着タル日本ハ決シテアメリカヲ脅威スルヤウ  
ナ軍備計畫ヲ爲テ、建艦競争ヲ誘發スル意思ハ毛  
ナシ。近小規模ノモノヲ我良ヲスルノダ、西太平洋  
ニ於ケル日本ノ海上國防ガ安固デアル其ノ近小規模  
ダケヲ作ルノダト云フ考テ居ルノデアルカラ、日本  
國ニ建艦競争ガ起ルコトハナイト一應ハ言ヒ得ルノ  
デアルガ、併シ日本ノ所信ハ免モアレ、アメリカニ  
於テハアメリカノ公人ガ提唱シテ居ルガ如ク、果シ  
テ日本ノ新軍備計畫ヲ如何ニ見ルカ。之ヲ、日本ハ  
軍備條約ノ精神ニ反シテ建艦競争ニ乗出シタノダト  
云フ口實ニ取ソテ乗出シテ來レバ如何、若シ單ニ條  
約違反ノ事情ダケガ原因ナラバ乗出シテ來ナイカモ  
分ラナイ。併シ我初ニ知ベク如ク、アメリカノ考ヘ  
テ居ルコトガ、日本ノ東洋ニ於ケル影響ヲ展ラ得マ  
スシテ一日モ早く東洋ノ國ニ亂ミ取ラナケレバナラ

ナイト云フノガ根本信念デアルナラバ、之亦何ヲカ  
言ハシヤデアル。

### ニ〇 競争ハ寧ロ歐洲ヨリ

イツレトモ斷斷ハ出來ナイハ、私ハ、製造競争ガ  
若シ起ルトスレバ、東洋方面ヲ起ルノデハナシニ、  
ヨーロッパデ起ルノデハナイカト考ヘル。ヨーロッパ  
ニ於テハ、昨年英獨ノ間テ合談ガ出來タガ、ドイ  
ツガ再軍備ヲ宣言シテ端々實行ニ乘リ出シタノニ對  
シ、之ヲ放任シテ置クハ大變ナコトニナルノデ、イ  
ギリスハ之ヲ抑ヘンガ爲ニアア云フ會談ヲシ、ドイ  
ツハ又、近イ將來ノ十年間カ、！ニカク相當期間ハ  
イギリスニ正面カラ衝突イテモ仕方ガナイカラ嫌々  
ナガライギリスト手ヲ端ルヤウ、格好デ行キタイト  
云フノデ、兩方ノ氣合ガ合ツテニ獨會談ガ出來タノ  
ダト思フガ、イギリスハ其ノ英獨會談ヲキツカケニ  
シテ昨年ノ軍縮會議ヲ開催シ、！ノ英獨會談ノライ  
ンデ今年ノ軍縮條約モリードシテ行カウト云フヤウ  
デアツタガ、事志ト違ツテイギリスノ思フヤウニナ  
ラナカツタ。會議ガ濟ンデソヴイエット、ポーラン  
ド、スウェーデン等ト話ラシテ居ルガ、ソヴイエツ  
トガ起ツテ來、殊ニドナツハ、世界大戦中ハ勿論ノ  
コト大戦直後モマダ國力が衰微シテ居ツテ、海軍ノ



整備ニ金ヲ費ケルコトが出来ナカツタノデアルガ、  
 近年ハ佛<sup>伊</sup>ト共ニドイツモ海軍ノ充實ニ意ヲ注グ事  
 態ニナツテ、イギリストシテハ非常ニ苦シイ立場ニ  
 ナツタノデ、歐洲ノ諸海軍國ヲ抑ヘ、少クトモ其ノ  
 ニツ位ガ京ニナツテ來テモ自分ノ所ハ決シテ敗レナ  
 イト云フヤウナ姿勢ヲ保持スルコトニ汲々トシテ居  
 ルヤウデアル。

最近ノヨウロッパノ情勢ハ諸君ノ御承知ノ通りデ  
 アツテ、今後スペインノ問題等が端緒ニナツテ紛糾  
 シテ來ルト大變ナコトニナルノデハナイカ。サウス  
 レバ歐洲ノ、ソヴィエツトカ、或ハドイツカ、或ハ  
 フランスカ、何レノ國ニナルカ分ラヌガ無艦競争ニ  
 乗出シテ、一國ノ投<sup>タ</sup>石<sup>イ</sup>石<sup>イ</sup>直<sup>チ</sup>三<sup>サ</sup>列<sup>リ</sup>國<sup>ク</sup>ニ直接間接ニ波  
 紋ヲ擴イテ來ル。サウスレバ無盾ノ急ニナツテ、イ  
 ギリスモドウシテモ乗出サザルヲ得ナイ。殊ニ新軍  
 備條約デハイギリストシテハ量的ノ制限ヲ全然受ケ  
 テキナイノデアルカラ、ヤラウト思ヘバ何時デモ出  
 來ル。英米ハ喧嘩ノ間ニバリテイト云フヤウナコト  
 テ行ツテ居ルノデアルカラ、イギリスガ勢力ヲ増セ  
 バアメリカモ之ニ隨從シテ來ルコトハ當然考ヘラレ  
 ル。或ハ少シ妄斷カモ知レナイガ、將來建艦競争ガ  
 起ルトスレバ、ソノ火元ハ、東洋デナシニ、ヨーロ

ツバテハナイカト考ヘテ居ル。之ハ一ニヨロツベ  
 各國ノ國際情勢が根本ニナルダラウト思フ。

## 二 將來ノ海軍豫算ノ基準

從ツテ將來ノ我が海軍ノ豫算デアルガ、若シ英海  
 ナル海軍が勃發シテ列國が公海航行ニ乗出スト云フ  
 ヤウナコトニナレバ、見越シハ全然付カナイガ、併  
 シソレデナイ限リ豫算トシテハ、新補充計畫ノ所要  
 兵力ヲ以テ十分満足スルモノデハナイガ、先ツ近イ  
 將來ヲ見越シテ計畫ヲ行テテ見ルト、今後海軍ノ景  
 算ハ大体十二年度ノ豫算が基準ニナリ、大ナル飛躍  
 的ナ増加ナシニ済ムノデハナイカ、マタ成ルベクソ  
 レテ済マシタイト云フ考ヲ持ツテ居ル。尤モ内閣  
 ニナルガ、海軍が大減省ニ要求シタ豫算ハ、認メラ  
 レタモノト決シテ同ジモノデハナイノデアツテ、相  
 當ナモノガ削ラレテ居ル。相當ニ重要ト見ラレルモ  
 ノモ削ラレ或ハ後年度ニ繰延ベラレタモノガアルカ  
 ラ十二年度ノ豫算通りテ後年度モ行ケルノ事トハ言  
 ヘナイ。重要ナモノハ勿論早ク手ヲ着ケルヤウナコ  
 トニナラナケレバナラヌカラ、若干ノ増加ハ免レ難  
 イ情勢ダト考ヘルガ、大体近キ將來ノ海軍豫算ハ十  
 二年豫算が基準ニナリ、ソレニ多少増加シタモノデ

903-41

除々當年ハ行ケルト御承ニ下サツテ宣カラウト是フ。  
我々モ出来ルダケサウ云フ瓜ニシテ行キタイ。

大體コノ程度ニ止メテ、アトハ御愛顧デモアレバ  
承ルコトト致シタイ。御清慮ヲ感謝ス。

(了)



903-42

証 明 書

「ワシントン」文書局 第 號

國 際 検 察 部 第 九 〇 三 號

典 據 及 ビ 公 正 ニ 關 ス ル 證 明

余、尾戸長春ハ余ガ下記ノ資格ニ於テ、即チ外務省  
文書課長代理トシテ、日本政府ト公的關係ニ在ルモ  
ノナルコト、竝ニ該官吏トシテ余ガ茲ニ添附セラレ  
タル、五十七頁ヨリ成ル、千九百三十七年ノ昭和十  
二年ノ一月附、下記題名、即チ十二年度海軍豫算要  
領並ニ海軍關係國防ノ全貌ニ就イテ（豐田副武中將  
長述）ノ文書ノ保管ニ任シ居ルコトヲ茲ニ證明ス。  
余ハ更ニ添附ノ記録及ビ文書ガ日本政府ノ公文書ナ  
ルコト、竝ニ右ガ下記名稱ノ省又ハ部局ノ公式書類  
及ビ綴ノ一部ナルコトヲ證明ス。（若シアラベ綴番  
號又ハ引用、其ノ他公式書類又ハ綴ニ於ケル該文書  
ノ成規所在ノ公式名稱ヲモ特記スベシ）

千九百四十六年／昭和二十一年／十月一日

東京ニ於テ署名

當該官吏署名欄 尾戸長春

右ノ者ノ公的資格 外務省文書課長代理

証 人 佐藤武五郎

公式入手ニ關スル証明

903A-43  
余、Eric W. Fleisher、少尉 0-935000  
ニリツクダブリウ・フアイシャ少尉  
軍官總司令部ニ關係アルモノナルコト、並ニ上記題  
名ノ文書ハ余ガ公務上、日本政府ノ上記署名官吏ヨ  
リ入手シタルモノナルコトヲ茲ニ證明ス。

千九百四十六年／昭和二十一年／十月一日

東京ニ於テ署名

氏 名 欄 Eric W. Fleisher 2d Lt

右ノ者ノ公的資格 國際警察部副官

証 人 Henry Shimajima



# MAJOR COMBATANT VESSELS OF JAPAN

Ex. 4916

IPS Document No. 6260

## ON HAND AND UNDER CONSTRUCTION

1931年乃至1945年に於ける日本軍艦の保有量及建造中量

ON HAND  
保有量

No. 1

Year (12月31日)	Battle Ships 戦艦		Aircraft Carriers 航空母艦		Heavy Cruisers 重巡洋艦		Light Cruisers 軽巡洋艦		Destroyers 駆逐艦		Submarine 潜水艦		Total 計	
	No 隻数	Tons 噸数	No 隻数	Tons 噸数	No 隻数	Tons 噸数	No 隻数	Tons 噸数	No 隻数	Tons 噸数	No 隻数	Tons 噸数	No 隻数	Tons 噸数
1931	10	301,400	3	61,270	8	68,400	19	91,355	110	123,940	67	71,174	217	717,539
1932	10	301,400	3	61,270	12	107,800	19	91,355	101	122,040	62	71,518	207	755,363
1933	10	301,400	4	68,370	12	107,800	19	91,355	101	123,956	59	69,298	205	762,179
1934	10	301,400	4	68,370	12	107,800	19	91,355	100	122,842	57	68,478	202	760,243
1935	10	301,400	4	68,370	12	107,800	21	108,355	96	118,520	60	73,998	203	778,243
1936	10	301,400	4	68,370	12	107,800	21	108,355	97	120,349	55	70,173	199	776,447
1937	10	301,400	5	78,420	15	133,300	20	99,855	108	136,458	59	75,623	217	825,057
1938	10	301,400	5	78,420	17	150,300	19	91,355	112	142,458	62	80,373	225	844,306
1939	10	301,400	6	88,470	18	158,800	19	91,355	116	149,458	62	80,373	231	869,853
1940	10	301,400	7	97,970	18	158,800	19	93,055	104	149,828	54	75,260	212	876,315
1941 (7 Dec)	10	301,400	10	152,970	18	158,800	20	98,855	112	165,868	65	97,900	235	975,797
1941	11	365,400	11	162,470	18	158,800	20	98,855	112	165,868	65	97,900	239	1,049,715
1942	10	370,740	10	153,370	17	156,400	20	100,185	101	156,439	67	102,831	225	1,039,165
1943	9	338,020	13	192,370	17	156,400	21	112,760	85	133,337	83	114,497	228	1,047,335
1944	9	338,020	12	254,730	12	109,850	9	50,570	63	99,159	67	92,922	172	945,251
1945 (31 Aug)	4	122,030	6	87,870	7	62,850	4	25,400	43	62,513	64	73,390	128	434,403



# UNDER CONSTRUCTION

## 建造中量

		0	0	1	1,100	4	39,400	2	17,000	8	12,604	6	9,669	21	85,773
1931		0	0	1	7,100	0	0	2	17,000	4	5,804	3	4,700	10	34,604
1932		0	0	0	0	0	0	3	25,500	6	8,208	7	9,600	16	43,308
1933		0	0	1	10,050	0	0	5	42,500	7	9,576	12	17,000	25	79,126
1934		0	0	1	10,050	0	0	4	34,000	13	18,180	7	10,200	25	72,430
1935		0	0	2	20,100	0	0	4	34,000	16	22,944	7	10,200	29	87,244
1936		0	0	3	50,050	2	17,000	0	0	11	19,000	8	15,420	25	165,470
1937		1	64,000	4	59,550	1	8,500	2	11,600	11	21,000	12	25,050	32	253,700
1938		2	128,000	3	49,500	0	0	3	17,400	15	30,000	19	38,700	42	263,600
1939		2	128,000	4	64,500	0	0	2	12,300	11	22,820	23	45,840	42	273,460
1940		2	128,000	4	77,860	0	0	4	27,500	12	27,120	29	42,554	51	303,034
1941		1	64,000	3	68,360	0	0	4	27,500	13	29,820	32	44,912	53	234,592
1942		0	0	7	166,860	1	12,500	4	27,500	11	24,420	49	64,560	72	295,840
1943		0	0	10	218,580	0	0	1	6,500	16	28,260	40	73,698	67	327,038
1944		0	0	2	29,960	0	0	0	0	21	29,340	25	35,910	48	95,210
1945		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	26	13,930	26	13,930
(15 Aug)															

No. 2

Note on HIEI:

The number and tonnage of Battleships  
from 1932 to 1940 includes the HIEI  
which was a training battleship during  
that period.

比叡に同する記事.

1932年より1940年までの戦艦隻数に正数中に  
當時練習戦艦であった比叡が含まれてゐる.

CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that I am officially  
connected with the Japanese government  
as Member of Research Division Second  
Demobilization Bureau, and that in  
such official capacity, I have prepared  
the foregoing table from official records  
of the Japanese government. I further  
certify that the table is true and  
accurate.

Nidemi Yoshida

Member of Research  
Division 2nd  
Demobilization Bureau.

Signed at Tokyo, Japan  
on this 23 day of September,  
1946:

S. Takano

證明書

私は茲に第二復員局資料  
整理部部長として正式に日  
本政府に所属し其の資格に  
於て日本政府の公式記録  
より前記表を作成したる事  
を証明す。更に前記表が  
眞實且正確なる事を記  
明す。

第二復員局資料整理部  
部長

吉田英三

1946年9月23日  
日本東京に於て

高野庄平



## SHIPS IN JAPANESE NAVY (日本海軍艦艇)

CRUISERS (輕巡洋艦)

No. 1

G4917

Year	Names	Dates		Builder	Displacement (Tonnage)	On Hand	No. of Guns	No. of Torpedoes
		Keel Laid	Launched					
1931	HIRATO 平戸	1910 8-10	1911 6-29	1912 6-17	4,950		6	8
	YAHAGI 矢野	1910 6-20	1911 10-3	1912 7-29	4,950		6	8
	TATSUTA 辰太	1917 7-24	1918 5-29	1919 3-31	3,230		5.5	4
	TENRYU 天龍	1917 5-17	1918 3-11	1919 11-20	3,230		5.5	4
	KUMA 熊鷹	1918 8-29	1919 7-14	1920 8-31	5,100		5.5	6
	TAMA 玉峰	1918 8-10	1920 2-10	1921 1-29	5,100		5.5	5
	KITAGAMI 北江	1919 9-1	1920 7-3	1921 4-15	5,100		5.1	4
	KISO 木曾	1919 6-10	1920 12-14	1921 5-4	5,100		5.5	5
	O 大井	1919 11-24	1920 4-15	1921 10-3	5,100		5.5	4
	NAGARA 長良	1920 7-9	1921 4-25	1922 4-21	5,170		5.5	5
1931	NATORI 名取	1920 12-14	1922 2-16	1922 9-15	5,170		5.5	5
	KINU 想取	1921 1-17	1922 5-29	1922 11-10	5,170		5.5	5
	YURA 由良	1921 5-31	1922 2-15	1923 3-20	5,170		5.5	7
	YUBARI 夕張	1922 6-5	1923 3-5	1923 7-31	2,890		5.5	5
	ISUZU 出雲	1920 8-10	1921 10-29	1923 8-15	5,170		5.1	6
	SENDAI 仙台	1922 2-16	1923 10-30	1924 4-29	5,195		5.5	6
	ABUKUMA 阿武隈	1921 12-8	1923 3-16	1923 5-26	5,170		5.5	5
	JINTSU 神通	1922 8-4	1923 12-8	1925 7-31	5,195		5.5	7
	NAKA 中城	1922 6-10	1925 3-24	1925 11-30	5,195		5.5	5
	Total 計				91,355		91,355	
1934~1935	Same as above							
	Plus MAGAMI 最上	1931 10-27	1934 3-14	1935 7-28	8,500		6.1	15
	Plus MIKUMA 三隈	1931 12-24	1934 5-31	1935 8-29	8,500		6.1	15
1935	Total 計				17,000		108,355	



[illegible]

NOTE  
The YASOSHIMA was placed in the group of light cruisers on September 25, 1944 after having been converted from the Chinese Cruiser MINNAN.

ハナ島は中華民国巡洋艦「平海」と整備し、9月10日  
9月25日 輕巡洋艦「瑞穂」に編入せるものなり

## HEAVY CRUISERS (重巡洋艦)

No. 3

Year 年	Names 艦名	Dates 年月日			Displacement (tonnage) 排水量 (噸)	On hand 保有量	Main guns 主砲 (吋)	
		Keel laid	Launched	Delivered			Cal (mm) 口径 (吋)	No. 数量
1931	FURUKA 古鷹	1922 12-5	1925 2-25	1926 3-31	?	7,100	8	6
	KAKO 加古	1922 11-17	1925 4-10	1926 7-20	?	7,100	8	6
	Aoba 青葉	1924 2-4	1926 9-25	1927 4-20	?	7,100	8	6
	KINUGASA 衣笠	1924 1-23	1926 10-24	1927 9-30	?	7,100	8	6
	NACHI 那智	1924 11-21	1927 6-15	1928 11-26	?	10,000	8	10
	MYOKO 妙高	1924 10-25	1927 4-16	1929 7-31	?	10,000	8	10
	HAGURO 羽黑	1925 3-16	1928 3-24	1929 4-25	1929 11-30	10,000	8	10
1932	ASHIGARA 足柄	1925 4-11	1928 4-22	1929 8-20	1929 11-30	10,000	8	10
	Total 計					68,400		
	Plus ATAGO 愛宕	1927 4-28	1930 6-16	1932 3-30	1932 12-1	9,850	8	10
	Plus TAKAO 高雄	1927 4-28	1930 5-12	1932 5-31	1932 12-1	9,850	8	10
	Plus CHOKAI 鳥海	1928 3-26	1931 4-5	1932 6-30	1932 12-1	9,850	8	10
	Plus MAYA 摩耶	1928 12-4	1930 11-8	1932 6-30	1932 12-1	9,850	8	8
	Total 計					39,400		
1933~ 1936	Same as above					107,800		
	Plus SUZUYA 鈴谷	1933 12-11	1934 11-20	1937 10-31	1937 12-1	8,500	8	10
	Plus KUMANO 熊野	1934 4-5	1936 10-15	1937 10-31	1937 12-1	8,500	8	10
	Plus MIKUMA 三隈	The 6.1 guns were removed and 8.9 guns installed. The 6.1 guns were removed and 8.9 guns installed. The 6.1 guns were removed and 8.9 guns installed.				8,500	8	10
	Total 計					25,500		
	Plus TONE 利根	1934 12-1	1937 11-21	1938 11-20	1939 5-20	8,500	8	8
	Plus MOGAMI 最上	The 6.1 guns were removed and 8.9 guns installed. The 6.1 guns were removed and 8.9 guns installed.				8,500	8	10
1938	Total 計					17,000		
	Plus CHIKUMA 筑摩	1935 10-1	1938 3-19	1939 5-20	1939 5-20	8,500	8	8
	Total 計					158,800		
	Plus CHIKUMA 筑摩	1935 10-1	1938 3-19	1939 5-20	1939 5-20	8,500	8	8
	Total 計					158,800		
	Plus CHIKUMA 筑摩	1935 10-1	1938 3-19	1939 5-20	1939 5-20	8,500	8	8
	Total 計					158,800		



	1898	1899	1900	1942					
Plus									
YAGUMO 八雲	9-1	7-8	6-20	7-1	2,000	8	4		
Plus	1898	1900	1901	1942	9,200	8	4		
IWATE 岩手	11-11	3-29	3-18	7-1					
Plus	1898	1899	1900	1942	9,200	8	4		
IZUMO 出雲	5-14	9-19	9-25	7-1					
Minus									
KAKO 加古					-29,800				
FORUTAKA 古鷹									
KIYUDASA 木戸									
MICHIMA 三波									
Total (Balance) 計残					-2,400	156.40			
1943						156.40			
Same as above						40			
Minus									
ATAGO 赤松					-46,550	109.85			
MAYA 摩耶									
SUZUYA 鈴屋									
1945					-47,000	62.85			
Minus									
MACHI 町屋									
ASHIMARU 足守									
HAGURO 羽黒									
KURAMO 久留美									
CHIKUMA 志保									

NOTE

記 事

a) The SUZUYA, KURAMO, TONE and CHIKUMA were planned and under construction until 1936 as light cruisers with 6.1" guns but the plan was altered to mount 8" guns aboard them in 1937 and they saw ultimate completion as heavy cruisers.

b) The YAGUMO, IWATE and IZUMO were transferred on July 1, 1942 from the list of Coast Defense to that of Heavy Cruiser.

CERTIFICATE

証明書

I hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government as Member of Research Division, Second Demobilization Bureau, and that in such official capacity, I have prepared the foregoing table from official records of the Japanese Government. I further certify that table is true and accurate.

a) 船名、艦野、利根及加古の1936年来37.6"口径の軽巡洋艦として計画され、1937年より8"口径の重巡洋艦として改修された。計画変更は重巡洋艦として設計され、1937年7月1日海防艦隊より海軍艦隊へ編入された。

b) 八雲、摩耶及出雲は1942年7月1日海防艦隊より海軍艦隊へ編入された。

Midemi Yoshida

Member of Research Division  
and Demobilization Bureau

1946年10月7日  
日本東京に於て  
高野庄平

第二復員局資料整理部員  
吉田 英三

Signed at Tokyo, Japan,  
on this 7 day of  
October, 1946:  
S. Tadeano



Dec 62 63

# SHIPS IN JAPANESE NAVY 日 本 海 軍 の 軍 艦 CARRIERS (CV) 航 空 母 艦

EX 916  
NO 1

Year 年	Names 艦 名	Dates 年 月 日				Displacement (Tonnage) 排水量 (t)	On hand 保有量	Main guns 主砲		Remarks 備 考
		Keel laid 起 工	Launched 進 水	Completed 竣工 改裝 竣工	Delivered 引 渡	Commissioned 就 役		Caliber 口 徑 (吋)	N.O. 数	
1931	HOSHIO 鳳 翔	1919 12-16	1921 11-13		1922 12-29	1922 12-29	2470	5.5	4	
	AKAGI 赤 城	1920 12-6	1925 4-22		1927 3-25	1927 3-25	26,900	8	6	
	KAGA 加 賀	1920 7-19	1921 11-17		1928 3-31	1928 3-31	26,900	8	10	
	Total 計						61,270			
	Same as above						41,270		8	
1932	Same as above						68,370	5.1	12	
1933	Same as above	1929 11-26	1931 4-2		1933 5-9	1933 10-20	68,370	5.1	12	
1934	Same as above						68,370	5.1	12	
1937	Same as above	1934 11-20	1935 12-23		1937 12-29	1937 12-29	78,420	5.1	12	
1938	Same as above						78,420	5.1	12	
1939	Same as above	1936 7-8	1937 11-16		1939 7-5	1939 11-15	88,470	5.1	12	
1940	Same as above	1936 6-20	1936 6-19	1938 1-15	1940 12-27	1940 12-27	9,500	5.1	8	Converted from SS "KASUGA" - 1940 商 船 嘉 古 丸 改 裝
1941	SHOKAKU 翔 龍	1937 11-12	1937 6-1		1941 8-8	1941 8-25	20,000	5.1	16	
	TAIYO 大 鷹	1940 1-6	1940 9-19	1941 10-	1941 8-39	1941 8-31	15,000	5.1	6	
	ZUIKAKU 瑞 鳳	1937 5-1	1939 11-27		1941 8-25	1941 9-25	20,000	5.1	16	
	SHOHU 祥 鳳	1941 12-3	1945 1-1	1940 11-15	1941 12-20	1941 12-20	7,500	5.1	8	Converted from SS "KASUGA" - 1941 商 船 嘉 古 丸 改 裝
	Total 計						64,500			
1942	Same as above	1939 3-20	1941 6-26	1941 2-11	1942 5-3	1942 5-3	19,000	5.1	12	Converted from SS "KASUGA" - 1942 商 船 嘉 古 丸 改 裝
	UNYO 雲 鷹	1938 12-14	1939 10-31	1942 1-	1942 5-31	1942 5-31	15,000	4.7	6	Converted from SS "KASUGA" - 1942 商 船 嘉 古 丸 改 裝
	HIYO 飛 鷹	1939 11-30	1944 6-24	1941 2-11	1942 7-31	1942 7-31	19,000	5.1	12	Converted from SS "KASUGA" - 1942 商 船 嘉 古 丸 改 裝
	CHUYO 中 鷹	1938 5-9	1939 5-28	1942 6-	1942 11-25	1942 11-25	15,000	4.7	6	Converted from SS "KASUGA" - 1942 商 船 嘉 古 丸 改 裝
	KYUHO 蒼 鳳	1933 4-12	1938 11-16	1942 1-	1942 11-30	1942 11-30	13,400	5.1	8	Converted from SS "KASUGA" - 1942 商 船 嘉 古 丸 改 裝
							162,470			
							153,370			

